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Abstract
Theoretically based in a Judaic philosophy and in Kafka’s related mythology, which
locates the origins of the world in language, this thesis takes its practical starting point from a
relatively little-documented writing method of Kafka that appears inseparably linked to his
language mythology. This writing method is one in which Kafka developed the fictional world
of his narratives out of language or associations in language. In a unique attempt to document
its full impact on the development of a literary text, the thesis seeks to utilize this writing
method as a reading method, identifying the verbal associations from which Kafka wrote one of
his most recognized narratives, the short story “In der Strafkolonie.”
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Introduction
“Im Anfang war das Wort […]”1
“The extent of speech must needs be vast, since it is nearly commensurate to thought itself […]”-Isaac Barrow2

Theoretically based in a Judaic philosophy and in Kafka’s related mythology, which
locates the origins of the world in language, this thesis takes its practical starting point from a
relatively little-documented writing method of Kafka that appears inseparably linked to his
language mythology. This writing method is one in which Kafka developed the fictional world
of his narratives out of language or associations in language. In a unique attempt to document
its full impact on the development of a literary text, the thesis seeks to utilize this writing
method as a reading method, identifying the verbal associations from which Kafka wrote one of
his most recognized narratives, the short story “In der Strafkolonie.”

An Overview of Franz Kafka’s Law and Language Mythology
Franz Kafka (1883-1924), undeniably one of the most profound and impactful writers,
not just in twentieth century German literary history, but in all of German literary history, is
widely recognized among Kafka scholars as a type of philosopher of language and writer of
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Johannes 1:1.
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The Works of the Learned Isaac Barrow (131).
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language myths. Scholars who study Kafka’s language mythology almost invariably link it,
however, to a more fundamental legal mythology. Indeed, according to the studies of many
well-known Kafka scholars, such as Wilhelm Emrich, Walter Sokel, and Clayton Koelb, the Law,
or the meaning of the Law, does not just define a few of Franz Kafka’s literary works in
particular, but is the primary pursuit of his life and literature in general. Allen Thiher succinctly
reflects the findings of these scholars in his book Fiction Refracts Science, when he writes:
“Nearly every novel or story by Kafka at least implies some attempt to know the nature of the
law, or das Gesetz, that all desire to know” (137). These scholars have long seen in Kafka more
than simply one of the great literary giants of the twentieth century. For them, Kafka is also a
brilliant legal philosopher, whose works offer penetrative insight into the nature of the Law,
and he accomplishes this in its most abstract and varied sense. As Thiher has also written,
“Kafka’s work lays bare the ambivalent senses that attach to the concept of the law” (137). For
these scholars Kafka is, among countless other things, one of the great humanist thinkers,
political minds, religious theologians, and language philosophers of the twentieth century,
whose legal myths, or symbols of the Law in his fictional narratives, are equally profound as
they are ambiguous. According to the studies of these scholars, the only certain characteristic
of Kafka’s mythological Law is that it is an indecipherable Law: it is absent from the world. In
his book Franz Kafka, one of the most comprehensive and well-known studies among the works
of these scholars, Wilhelm Emrich, for example, appears to define Kafka, among many other
things, as a humanist thinker in the broadest sense. Emrich appears to attribute a perceptive
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genius to Kafka through which his literary works achieve a kind of universal law in the unbridled
expression of all human possibility in thought and being:
Der universelle Überblick wird also dadurch gewonnen, daß Kafka allen
menschlichen Möglichkeiten schrankenlos Raum läßt. Das gilt nicht nur für […]
die logischen Denkmöglichkeiten, sondern überhaupt für das gesamte bewußte
und unterbewußte Dasein des Menschen. (37)
And yet, Emrich’s study of Kafka’s life and works is colored throughout with the doubleawareness that Kafka’s universal law, while humanistic, is absolutely different than human law.
For Emrich, the “limits of the human,” or what he calls “die Grenzen der Menschheit,”
necessarily separate mankind from the universal law in Kafka’s mythology (44). In his essay
“Freedom and Authority in the Fiction of Franz Kafka,” the long-time and famous Kafka scholar,
Walter Sokel, who is well-known for his early and comprehensive studies in Kafka’s irony,
appears to operate from the same perspective as Emrich, though in a less abstract sense. Sokel
appears to regard Kafka as a profound political philosopher and his myths, which are often set
in abstract political or legal courts, as more literal depictions of the Law. For Sokel, Kafka’s
search for the past unity of the “Ideal Law,” in his letters and fictional narratives, is eternally
impeded through the divided presence of the “Actual Law.” According to Sokel, it is for this
reason that Kafka’s legal myths, particularly the symbolism of freedom and authority in his
fictional narratives, tend to be so strangely ambiguous and fully divided in representation. He
writes: “Kafka’s representations of the theme of freedom and authority make him appear to be
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both a master of subversion, a champion of the individual’s protest and revolt, and, at the same
time, one of the most subtle and consummate eulogists absolute power has found in modern
literature” (The Myth of Power 311). In a more abstract approach, Clayton Koelb, who is wellknown for his study on Kafka’s language mythology, hints at the vast number of scholars since
Max Brod who have interpreted the Jewish Kafka’s legal myths as part of a negative theology
within a Judeo-Christian framework.3 Koelb identifies in Kafka’s legal mythology the search for
the “absolute Whole,” a sacred Truth that is absent from the profane Truth present in the
world: “The poignancy of much of Kafka’s fiction lies in his continuing commitment to a sacred
realm of truth, law, and epistemological and ethical certainty, with which one cannot make
secure contact” (101).
Kafka’s legal mythology is almost invariably associated by Kafka scholars, such as
Clayton Koelb and Walter Sokel, with an equally abstract and ambiguous language mythology.
Allen Thiher nicely sums up this association, when he writes that Kafka’s diaries, letters, and
fictional narratives all appear rooted, to some extent, in “modern doubts that the law […] can

3

There is a well-established tradition of interpreting Kafka’s literary works as part of a negative Judeo-Christian
theology, in all its profundity and ambiguity. Max Brod, the first Kafka scholar and one of Kafka’s long-time and
closest friends, is well-known for his interpretation of Kafka’s texts allegorically, as a salvation history but with all
the complications and terror necessarily resulting from the finite human’s relationship to an infinite God. Other
scholars, like Sabina Kienlechner, see in Kafka’s texts, at least in part, depictions of a negative religion and the
painful and endless search for an absent God. Kienlechner, in Negativität der Erkenntnis im Werk Franz Kafkas,
writes extensively on Kafka’s personal and literary reflections on the biblical fall of man or on the Sündenfall, a
myth that, for Kafka, signified, among many other things, mankind’s lost connection to the truth. Other scholars,
like Ritchie Robertson and Ralf R. Nicolai, see an ironic reversal in Kafka’s negative theology. For Robertson, Kafka
is concerned with the estrangement of the modern world from absolute values, but also asks whether some
degree of estrangment is necessary for living. For Nicolai, the lost paradise, through the Sündenfall, is regained, in
Kleist and Kafka, in the reverse or from the backdoor.
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be revealed through language, at least human language” (139). According to these scholars,
Kafka’s search for the absent Law, in his life and literary works, is inextricably bound to the
writer, to the reading of verbal texts, and to the presence of human language. For Clayton
Koelb, in Kafka’s Rhetoric: The Passion of Reading, the absent Law in Kafka’s diaries, letters, and
fictional narratives is inseparably linked to the presence of verbal texts: “[For Kafka] the present
text becomes a reminder of the absence of that for which the text stands” (73). According to
Koelb, the absent Law, in Kafka’s language mythology, ultimately leads to both a violent or
deadly mode of reading verbal texts and to an antithetical human mode. With intended
reference to the images of “In der Strafkolonie,” Koelb writes: “The text is most effective when
it makes the reader painfully aware of his distance from [the text’s] origin” (73). And he also
writes: “[…] a book, capable of being misread, its meaning ignored or unseen, would have the
complex, ambiguous (vieldeutig) quality of persons, not the deadly mechanical character of an
apparatus” (89). For Walter Sokel, in his essay “Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of Franz
Kafka,” Kafka associates an absent Truth with the presence of language, and he does this,
according to Sokel, from both a “naturalist” and a “spiritualist” perspective. From the
“naturalist” perspective, Kafka, as a German-speaking Jew and isolated writer of subjective,
metaphoric signifiers, has lost access to the community and to the Truth. From the “spiritualist
perspective,” Kafka has lost access to the Truth, because language, as metaphor, can only refer
to the sensory world. Sokel covers both perspectives when he writes: “[For Kafka] metaphoric
speech is untruth […]” (Myth of Power 85). Kafka’s twentieth century language mythology, or
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his association of the absent Law with the presence of human language, as shown in the studies
of Walter Sokel and Clayton Koelb, appears inseparably linked to a writing method through
which he developed his legal myths or fictional language narratives, such as “In der
Strafkolonie” (1914), out of associations in language. The particular nature of this writing
method can be traced, perhaps most fundamentally however, to a traditional Judaic language
philosophy, which locates the origins of the existing world within the vast network of
associations in the Hebrew language of the Torah, or Jewish Written Law.

A Judaic Language Philosophy and Kafka’s Language Mythology
Franz Kafka, a writer widely recognized for his profound and ambiguous philosophy of
language and his various language myths, remains strangely little recognized for a writing
method, through which he developed a myth, or the fictional world of a narrative, almost
entirely out of associations in language or from associations in his word choice. This writing
method, while linked to twentieth century Kafka and his language mythology, appears most
fundamentally rooted in forms of a traditional Judaic language philosophy. According to
scholars, such as Detlef Kremer and Erich Grözinger, this philosophy, of which the highly
educated Kafka was clearly aware, originates in ancient biblical conceptions of the world and
essentially identifies it, and its development, with language.4 Detlef Kremer, a highly regarded
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While many scholars have rightly criticized the narrow, Judeo-theological approach to Kafka, they have also never
ceased to affirm the fundamental validity of it, beginning with Max Brod. Brod and countless scholars after him
have recognized Kafka’s obsession with his Jewish roots, his studies and influences in the Hebrew Bible, the
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Kafka scholar, defines it in the strict sense, in a comprehensive study on Kafka’s philosophy of
writing and writing method. Kremer explains that within Judaic philosophy, God’s creation of
the world is a verbal creation: “In jüdischer Sicht stellt sich die gesamte Weltschöpfung als eine
verzögerte Sprachschöpfung dar (132).” Ultimately, the world’s entire history, according to
Kremer’s further delineation, is not created by God, but consists in the never-ending network of
associations that originate from and center around his name: “[der Prozeß der Weltgeschichte]
besteht in einer unendlichen Variation und Meditation über den Eigennamen Gottes […]” (132).
In the strict sense of this traditional Judaic language philosophy, according to Kremer, the
existing world, from its absolute origins through the entirety of its development, is nothing but
language or a verbal text. Karl Erich Grözinger sums this up nicely, in a study of Kafka and the
language philosophies of the Kabbalah, when he writes: “Gott selbst ist diese schöpferische
Sprache [und] die ganze Welt ist wie die Tora nichts anderes als […] ein […] Text” (156-157).
As both Kremer and Grözinger demonstrate, however, traditional Judaic language
philosophy’s strict association of the existing world with a verbal text is also hardly a simple or
unambiguous association. According to Grözinger, for instance, one logical consequence of a
world that is language, particularly within the Kabbalah, is the creative power of humans: “Ist

Hebrew language, eastern Judaism, the Yiddish theater, and the Zionist movement, for example. Erich Grözinger,
in particular, notes that Kafka’s knowledge of the creative power of language in Kabbalah, while to some extent
verifiable in his diaries and letters, can even be assumed, as every child in Prag in the early twentieth century
would have known of it: “Die Kenntnis dieser Tradition von der schöpferischen Macht der Sprache darf man bei
dem Prager Juden Kafka gewiß voraussetzen, war doch Prag die Heimat jenes legendenumwobenen Kabbalisten
Liwa Ben Bezalel, des Hohen Rabbi Löw, von dessen Golemschöpfung jedes Prager Kind gehört hat” (161). For an
extensive overview of Kafka and Judaism, see Ritchie Robertson’s Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature.
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die Welt nach der Auffassung der Kabbalisten […] also Sprache, so folgt daraus die logische
Konsequenz, daß auch der Mensch […] an dieser sprachlich-kreativen Macht teilhat […]” (157).
From old Jewish writings, a correlative idea to this also developed, which attributed creative
power to all forms of verbal language. This idea identifies the world’s origins and development,
not just in God’s name, but in every name or in every association within the Hebrew language.
Grözinger writes:
Es sind [die] altjüdischen Texte […], welche eine Theologie der Gottesnamen
entwickelten, die nicht nur jedem in der Bibel genannten Gottesnamen
schöpferische Kräfte zusprach, sondern darüber hinaus jedem aus hebräischen
Buchstaben zusammengesetzten Wort, ja sogar ‘sinnlosen’ Buchstabengruppen
und schließlich jedem einzelnen Buchstaben des hebräischen Alphabetes. (154)
In traditional Judaic language philosophy, particularly in Kabbalah, humans, as users of
language or of the endless associations within language, can create the world.
According to Grözinger and Kremer, the most practical and problematic implications of
human language creation, within traditional Judaic language philosophy, can be found in the
work of the Torah-scholar. In Jewish theology, the Torah, strictly defined as the Jewish Written
Law contained in the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, is also the world. Therefore, implies
Grözinger, as the Kabbalist studies this Law, he not only discovers the nature of the world
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within every possible verbal association the text contains, he also participates, through this
discovery, in the creation of God’s world:
Beim Herstellen solcher Kombinationen [Wortverbindungen,
Zahlwertberechnungen, Buchstabenumstellungen, u.s.w.] entdeckt der Kabbalist
das unter der Oberfläche verborgene Wesen der Dinge, sieht Gemeinsamkeiten
und Wesensidentitäten. Zugleich bewirkt er damit ein entsprechendes Resultat
in der göttlichen Welt (164).
While readers of the Torah can create the world, it is, practically speaking, the work of the
writer of the Torah that is most creative, and potentially problematic, within the Judaic,
philosophical framework. As Kremer demonstrates, writers of the Torah, defined in the strict
sense, must be keenly aware, at all times, both of the creative power of their task and of the
absolutely destructive potential inherent in it. If the Torah is the Written Law that is the world,
any mistake, or change, in the reading and writing of this Law could [negatively] transform the
world: “Denn nur ein Wort, falsch geschrieben, kann die Welt verändern” (133). In this way,
the work of the writer of the Torah, or the effect of the language any Torah-scholar reads and
writes, might easily become less the Godly creation of the world than the human
transformation, even the ever destructive transformation of it.
As Kremer and Grözinger also partly demonstrate, the Judaic identification of the world
with human language, particularly with the potentially transformative and destructive work of
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the writer of the Torah, as reader and writer of the Law, appears to have had a certain
fundamental influence on Kafka’s life as a writer and writing method.5 Such influence is most
readily apparent in the various language myths that appear central to the structure of many of
Kafka’s most recognized narratives. A scene, for example, in Kafka’s earliest extant narrative,
“Beschreibung eines Kampfes” (1904-1907), appears to reverse the Biblical account of God’s
creation of the world. In the Hebrew Bible, God created the world in speaking or through
verbal commands: “Und Gott sprach: Es sammle sich das Wasser unter dem Himmel an
besondere Orte, dass man das Trockene sehe. Und es geschah so” (I. Mose I.9). In Kafka’s text,
the first-person narrator creates, or transforms, his natural surroundings as he wishes and
simply in speaking to it or through verbal requests: “‘Jetzt aber-ich bitte euch-Berg, Blume,
Gras, Buschwerk und Fluß, gebt mir ein wenig Raum, damit ich atmen kann.’ Da entstand ein
eilfertiges Verschieben in den umliegenden Bergen […]” (Nachgelassene Schriften 1:81).6
Another scene in a short story originally included in “Beschreibung eines Kampfes,” “Gespräch

5

A diary entry suggests that even Kafka made the general connection between his literary work and the work of
the Torah-scholar as a kabbalistic reader and writer of the Law. Apparently also alluding to his own literary work,
Kafka writes of a literature that contains the potential to be a new Kabbalah: „Diese ganze Litteratur ist Ansturm
gegen die Grenze und sie hätte sich, wenn nicht der Zionismus dazwischen gekommen wäre, leicht zu einer neuen
Geheimlehre, einer Kabbala entwickeln können. Ansätze dazu bestehen. Allerdings ein wie unbegreifliches Genie
wird hier verlangt, das neu seine Wurzeln in die alten Jahrhunderte treibt oder die alten Jahrhunderte neu
erschafft [...]“ (Tagebücher 878).
6

I owe both references to Kafka’s “Beschreibung eines Kampfes,” in part, to Erich Grözinger. He has also
interpreted the two passages within the specific framework of traditional Judaic language philosophy, and my
interpretation was certainly influenced by his. Indeed, all references to Kafka and traditional Judaic philosophy in
the thesis are colored by his and Kremer’s work. The core research from the Hebrew Bible, and from Kafka’s
stories, diaries, and letters, is mostly mine, however, for I have studied these works myself and quite
independently of Grözinger and Kremer. The passages from Kafka, which I have included in the thesis, are also
well-known passages among Kafka scholars in general.
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mit dem Betrunkenen,” appears to reverse traditional Judaic language philosophy’s strictest
conception of biblical creation. Far from creating the world out of God’s name, the narrator
appears to transform the structures of the world through the random and highly subjective
names he gives them. Speaking to the heavens, and to the moon, he wonders at this
transformative, even potentially destructive capacity in his naming:
Warum bist du nicht mehr so übermütig, wenn ich dich nenne “Vergessene
Papierlaterne in merkwürdiger Farbe.” Und warum ziehst du dich fast zurück,
wenn ich dich “Mariensäule” nenne und ich erkenne deine drohende Haltung
nicht mehr Mariensäule, wenn ich dich nenne “Mond, der gelbes Licht wirft.” Es
scheint nun wirklich, daß es Euch nicht gut tut, wenn man über Euch nachdenkt;
Ihr nehmt ab an Mut und Gesundheit. (Erzählungen 17)
Many of Kafka’s later legal narratives, e.g., “In der Strafkolonie” (1914), appear to contain
variations of a language myth that reverses the central Judaic image of the reader and writer of
the Tora, or Jewish Written Law, as creator of the world. Far from creating the natural
structures of the world, the central characters in these stories appear to destroy legal
structures through reading and writing the Law(s). Kafka’s short story “Der Neue Advokat”
(1920), for example, tells of a horse, Bucephalus, who had once carried his master, Alexander
the Great, to the unreachable gates of India. Alexander is now gone, and because there is
nobody to hold the reins, to point the way to India as Alexander once did, Bucephalus appears
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to try the next best thing, to become a lawyer and to read of Alexander and of India in the law
books:
Heute- das kann niemand leugnen- gibt es keinen großen Alexander [und]
niemand, niemand kann nach Indien führen. Schon damals waren Indiens Tore
unerreichbar, aber ihre Richtung war durch das Königsschwert bezeichnet.
Heute sind die Tore ganz anderswohin und weiter und höher vertragen; niemand
zeigt die Richtung; viele halten Schwerter, aber nur, um mit ihnen zu fuchteln;
und der Blick, der ihnen folgen will, verwirrt sich. Vielleicht ist es deshalb
wirklich das Beste, sich, wie es Bucephalus getan hat, in die Gesetzbücher zu
versenken. Frei […] liest und wendet er die Blätter unserer alten Bücher.
[emphasis added] (Erzählungen 167)
Though Kafka’s story ends with the possibility that Bucephalus reaches India by way of figures,
or in reading the law books, it also hints at an alternative ending. Far from finding India, in
successfully submitting to Alexander’s leadership, Bucephalus’ behavior, as free reader, appears
to lead, figuratively, to the behavior of the independent subjects. As a free reader, Bucephalus
would be confused in vision and flailing about uselessly, not with swords, as do the
independent subjects, but with words.7 The successful unity of authority and subject, under
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This reading is partly informed by Kafka’s repeated tendency to associate words with sharp, sword-like weaponry.
He writes, for example: “Jedes Wort […] wird zum Spieß, gekehrt gegen den Sprecher (Tagebücher 926).
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Alexander’s leadership, is relegated to the past under Bucephalus because the presence of
human language breaks the Law.
In much the same way as his fictional characters with the written Law(s), Kafka
intimately identified his life with his literature. In a letter to Felice Bauer, he wrote: “Ich habe
kein litterarisches Interesse sondern bestehe aus Litteratur, ich bin nichts anderes und kann
nichts anderes sein [...]” (Briefe 1913 261). Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, there is
often very little distinction between the legal relationships in Kafka’s fictional narratives and the
personal or familial relationships of his autobiographical works. One of Kafka’s most famous
short stories, “Das Urteil” (1912), for example, tells of a verbal conflict as legal trial between
father and son, culminating in the deadly judgment of the father. The story appears to develop
further within a lengthy letter Kafka addressed, but never gave, to his actual father, “Brief an
den Vater” (1919). It is largely a statement by Kafka, in which he appears to defend himself,
exposing the powerful father of his youth. Kafka wrote, for example: “Unverständlich war mir
immer Deine vollständige Empfindungslosigkeit dafür, was für Leid und Schande Du mit Deinen
Worten und Urteilen mir zufügen konntest, es war, als hättest Du keine Ahnung von Deiner
Macht” [emphasis added] (13).8 In fact, Kafka identified with Georg Bendemann, the fictional
son in “Das Urteil,” through verbal associations in their respective names. He wrote, in a letter
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Much like Kafka’s “Brief an den Vater,” the short story “Gespräch mit dem Beter,” also originally included in
“Beschreibung eines Kampfes” (1904-1907), appears to reference the son in exposing the father. It includes a
reverse chronology of two well-known biblical events [the Tower of Babel and Ham’s rebellion from Genesis 11
and 9] that appears to associate the confusion of human language at the Tower of Babel with the breakdown of
the human family, particularly with Ham’s exposure of his drunk and naked father, Noah.
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to Felice Bauer: “[...] Sieh nur die Namen! [...] Georg hat so viel Buchstaben wie Franz,
‚Bendemann’ besteht aus Bende und Mann, Bende hat so viel Buchstaben wie Kafka und auch
die zwei Vokale stehn an gleicher Stelle [...]” (Briefe 1913 201). Reversing one of the central
images of the writer of the Torah in traditional Judaic language philosophy, Kafka appears, not
to create the world, but to break the Law through the literature he wrote, and he ultimately did
this through verbal associations, not within God’s name, but within his name, 9 or in any name
or verbal expression.

Kafka’s Method of Writing through Verbal Associations
Kafka wrote in a diary entry: “Wenn ich wahllos einen Satz hinschreibe z.B. Er schaute
aus dem Fenster so ist er schon vollkommen” (Tagebücher 30). Whatever else Kafka meant by
this, it is certainly possible to interpret it as a statement on his writing method, one in which a
complete text develops through the writing of a random verbal expression. Support for such an
interpretation, and its clarification, appears to be found in the numerous studies on Kafka’s
writing method, such as that of Oliver Jahraus in his multifaceted book Franz Kafka. For
Jahraus, Kafka’s ideal text develops out of itself: “Der entscheidende Wert besteht darin, dass
die zu erzählende Geschichte sich von selbst entwickelt” (72). The text most often used to
demonstrate this writing style is the short story “Das Urteil” (1912), which Kafka described as

9

Gustav Janouch, who is most famous for his documented conversations with Kafka, also recalled, for example, a
comment made by Kafka, in which he appears to find himself defined through Czech associations in his name: “‘Ich
bin ein ganz unmöglicher Vogel […] ich bin eine Dohle- eine kavka’” (36).
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his greatest success and which he wrote in a single night: “Diese Geschichte ‘Das Urteil’ habe
ich in der Nacht vom 22 zum 23 von 10 Uhr abends bis 6 Uhr früh in einem Zug geschrieben”
(Tagebücher 460). A few highly renowned Kafka scholars, such as Malcolm Pasley, Clayton
Koelb, and Stanley Corngold, have linked this writing method of Kafka with a keen eye for
discovering the associations in language. For these scholars, Kafka’s texts develop out of
themselves because isolated words and verbal expressions carry within themselves vast
networks of associations, and they have recognized a direct affinity between the fictional
structures of Kafka’s narratives and the verbal structures that name them. Likely beginning
with Günther Anders (Kafka―Pro und Contra, 1951), who links key images and events in a few
of Kafka’s narratives with a literalization of the metaphor, these scholars typically associate the
fictional world in Kafka’s narratives with the broad spectrum of associative language. Malcolm
Pasley, for example, writes that Kafka’s texts are driven, to some extent, by subtle word play
that references real people and events outside of the text, in the way that “der frühere
Kommandant,” in Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie,” might reference Franz Kafka. Pasley writes:
“[Kafka geht] über Wortspiele und verdeckte Redefiguren [hinaus] und [bezieht] sich
stillschweigend auf wirkliche Gegenstände, Personen, oder Erreignisse außerhalb des Textes”
(68). For Clayton Koelb, Kafka’s texts are often centered, not just in a literalization of the
metaphor, as with Anders, but in the equal possibility of literalization and figuration in the use
of metaphor. Koelb writes: “Kafka draws the reader’s attention to the possibility of slippage
between literal and figurative uses [of metaphor]” (117). To illustrate this, Koelb refers, for
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example, to one of Kafka’s parable-like short stories that Max Brod published posthumously
under the title “Der Kreisel” about a philosopher who fails to understand a spinning top. For
Koelb, the philosopher’s failed attempt at understanding is rooted in an attempt to read the
metaphor begreifen (“to understand”):
The paradox of [the philosopher’s] situation, which ultimately turns his hope into
nauseated despair, is that the act of grasping the spinning top cannot give him a
grasp of it; begreifen (in the literal sense) positively excludes begreifen (in the
figurative sense) because of course the act of grasping the top causes it to stop
spinning, to become nothing more than a “silly piece of wood” of no
philosophical interest. (118)
Much like Koelb with Kafka’s philosophic insight, Stanley Corngold appears to locate much of
Kafka’s legal insight, including the development of the legal structures in his fictional narratives,
within all the tensions of metaphoric language, including historical, literal, and figurative
tensions. Corngold writes, for example:
Kafka perceives that the apparent harmlessness of metaphors in common usage
conceals the struggle of wills to make words mean one thing rather than
another. In organizing stories around the effort to interpret image-words and
concept-words advantageously, in making culpability and even death the cost of
failure in this effort, Kafka dramatizes the severity of the struggle […] The
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imposition of meaning naturally involves force [and] this struggle rages in the
hero: he is the arena of contesting interpetations of the metaphor […] (The
Necessity of Form 95)
As Stanley Corngold appears to demonstrate, Franz Kafka, a philosopher of the Law and writer
of legal myths, was also a verbal analyst, who developed these myths out of associations in
language.

The Thesis and Method of Reading Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie”
While a few well-respected Kafka scholars, like Clayton Koelb and Stanley Corngold,
have linked Franz Kafka with a writing method through which he developed the fictional world
of his narratives out of associations in language, the studies or readings of these scholars are,
for the most part, highly theoretical and not supported by extensive close reading.10 They are
often rooted in abstract, linguistic concepts and, when practically applied to Kafka’s texts, they
remain general in focus and are never restricted to the fullness and complexity of any specific
text. Stanley Corngold’s study, in Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form (1988), for example,
begins with modern linguistic concepts and twentieth century language philosophy, e.g., the
metaphoric nature of language,11 and ultimately ends with theories of Kafka’s writing method,

10

See, for example, Clayton Koelb, Kafka’s Rhetoric: The Passion of Reading, and Stanley Corngold, Franz Kafka:
The Necessity of Form.
11

Referencing, for example, the modern philosophies of Fritz Mauthner and Friedrich Nietzche, Corngold writes of
the loss of Urbedeutung within the virtually infinite conjunction of man-made, historical images in any given word:

18

not so much in the practical demonstration of it. Corngold clearly regards two of Kafka’s most
famous short stories, “Die Verwandlung” and “Das Urteil” (1912), as unique metaphoric
developments, particularly in the extent to which this is the case. He writes, for example:
“The Judgment” is all in all remarkable in Kafka’s oeuvre for the extent to which
it is informed by metaphor. It is about the way the metaphor of judgment is
read, but more, it is an enactment of the stakes in the judging of metaphors as
such […] with the result that it will make sense to see father and son as seeking
to destroy one another by literalizing the open figure that the other is (Necessity
of Form 97).
However, Corngold’s study does not include full interpretations of these stories, as metaphoric
developments. His interpretations are based in isolated readings of a few specific metaphors or
words, as they relate to narrow areas of these texts, such as the metaphor das Urteil
(“judgment”), as it relates to certain aspects of the hostile relationship between Georg
Bendemann and his father in Kafka’s “Das Urteil.” In short, Corngold never attempts in his
study to apply the full spectrum of associative language to a full reading of “Die Verwandlung”
or “Das Urteil.”

“Words act as semiotic memorials to a history of usages held to be similar; words fold together implications made
cognate by human wills” (Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form 93).

19

While no full reading of any of Kafka’s fictional narratives through verbal associations is
included in the studies of scholars such as Clayton Koelb and Stanley Corngold, “In der
Strafkolonie” appears to be one of the most neglected narratives in these studies. Clayton
Koelb leaves the story entirely out of his study, and while Stanley Corngold mentions the story
briefly, he only does so in referencing the contribution of Günther Anders, who claimed that
Kafka’s literal reading of a single figure of speech, Am eignen Leibe etwas erfahren [“To feel it
with your own body”], was the inspiration behind the story (Corngold 50). It is strange that
scholars such as Koelb and Corngold have not studied Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” more
extensively with regard to its verbal associations. This is particularly true because among
Kafka’s major short stories, including the two more famous contemporaries “Das Urteil” and
“Die Verwandlung,” “In der Strafkolonie” stands alone in the centrality and extent of its
language themes, and many scholars have approached the story in this respect, focusing their
studies almost exclusively on the verbal images and events in the fictional story. Indeed,
though it is one of Kafka’s most abstract and ambiguous legal stories, “In der Strafkolonie” is
also a language story, structured around verbal expressions and interpretations of the Old Law.
The story is set in a penal colony, and its plot essentially consists in the legal explanations of the
Officer of the Penal Colony to the visiting Traveler, who interprets and judges these
explanations. The Officer, who continues to follow the Old Commandant, presents the Old Law
to the Traveler within the specific case of the Condemned Man. This Old Law appears to consist
in the sole commandment to honor superiors and in a single judgment: the certainty of guilt.
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Those who are guilty under the Old Law are to be executed under a machine that slowly
inscribes the commandment, written as a legal document in intricate signs by the Old
Commandant, deep into their flesh. The condemned men are to interpret this commandment
as wounds on their body or as they die. According to the Officer’s explanations, however, the
Old Law is no longer followed under the influences of the New Commandant. Supporters are in
hiding, and in voicing their allegiance, they utter ambiguous expressions. Furthermore, instead
of one judge and a single judgment, as under the Old Commandant, the new courts, under the
New Commandant, consist of many judges. The Officer desires the Traveler’s verbal support
against the New Commandant and his influences, but for the Traveler the Old Law and
execution procedure is inhumane and unjust. Soon after the Traveler voices his judgment to
the Officer, the Officer frees the Condemned Man and places himself under the execution
machine. The story essentially ends as the Officer is killed and the machine self-destructs.
Because the story is set in a penal colony, many scholars, such as Rainer Stach, Paul
Peters, and Danilyn Rutherford, for example, understandably focus their studies of “In der
Strafkolonie” in its legal imagery. Some of these scholars approach the story literally and
interpret its imagery within early twentieth century or modern political contexts. Rainer Stach,
a well-respected biographer of Kafka, reasonably traces the violent images in the story, for
example, to WWI (557), whereas Paul Peters identifies in the story’s imagery an Urbild of the
terrifying and senseless history of European colonialism (403). The majority of scholars that
interpret the story in a legal context, do so, however, allegorically and embed their studies in
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abstract systems of twentieth century legal or philosophic thought, often hinting at Kafka’s
mythology of the absent Law in human language. Danilyn Rutherford, for example, approaches
“In der Strafkolonie” from the perspective of modern legal theory and argues that the
incomprehensibility of the Law both sustains it and brings about its own subversion. Axel
Hecker declares the story a post-modern, philosophical history, a “Geistesgeschichte en
miniature” (87), and claims that the destruction of the Old Commandant’s execution machine in
the Penal Colony signifies the deconstructive breakdown of signification in Kafka’s text, “In der
Strafkolonie,” itself.
Equally as many Kafka scholars base their allegorically-focused studies almost
exclusively on the verbal images and events in the fictional story, however. These studies are
often embedded in abstract systems of twentieth century linguistic thought, and they point,
more directly, to Kafka’s mythology of the absent Law in human language. Clayton Koelb, in his
study on Kafka’s highly equivocal reading concept, identifies the execution machine, under the
Old Law, as a writing and reading machine and the story’s central characters as readers of
verbal texts (69-108). For Koelb, reading the Old Law in the Penal Colony results in both a
violent or deadly mode of reading and an antithetical human one. In a slightly veiled reference
to the freed Condemned Man, under the Penal Colony’s New Law, Koelb writes, for example, of
the legal subject, who is now an independent reader: “This other reader, freed from the
authority of the text, becomes his own authority, a monarch unto himself” (91). Richard T.
Gray, in a study rooted in twentieth century deconstructive linguistic theory, identifies the
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structure of the execution machine as a symbol for the three-fold structure of the verbal sign:
the signified, the signifier, and the interpreter (225). For Gray, the execution machine and its
breakdown signifies not just operative disjunction in the sign figuratively, but also the literal
breakdown of communication between two of its interpreters, the Officer and the Traveler in
the Penal Colony (233). Gray also interprets the machine and its breakdown as a figure for the
actual instability in the story’s narrative structure itself: “[F]luctuation in perspective enacts on
the level of narrative structure, and as a consequence in the sphere of reader-response as well,
the problematic of successful mediation that lies at the heart of the story” (236). In the context
of scholarly research on “In der Stafkolonie,” Richard T. Gray’s study nicely represents the
starting point from which this thesis begins. Gray’s “problematic of successful mediation,”
between two different perspectives on the level of narrative structure, takes the form, in this
thesis, of two oppositional readings of the verbal signs in Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie”: A
reading primarily from the perspective of the Officer under the Old Law and a reading primarily
from the perspective of the Traveler under the New Law.
Because Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is so uniquely centered in verbal images and
events, and because it is one of Kafka’s most-recognized language myths, it was chosen for the
thesis to demonstrate the profound effect of Kafka’s writing method through verbal
associations on the development of a literary text. To this end, the thesis will be founded in
German lexical research. The Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm is
used particularly with regard to historical or etymological language associations. With the aid
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of the Deutsches Wörterbuch, the main body of the thesis attempts to utilize Kafka’s writing
method as a reading method. Through the lens of Kafka’s twentieth century language
mythology, rooted in traditional Judaic language philosophy, this thesis seeks to develop the
fictional world of Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” through verbal associations. Much like the
studies of Stanley Corngold, though applied to an entire text, it seeks to trace the broken legal
structures of the story through the tensions of associative language. Through this method, the
thesis ultimately aims to re-create, for the reader as it was for the writer, a life comprised
entirely of literature or a world that finds its origins in verbal associations. Much like the Officer
and the Traveler, who read the intricate signs of the Old Commandant’s legal documents, the
reader reads the verbal associations of Franz Kafka’s literary document. The legal procedures in
the Penal Colony are the verbal procedures that are “In der Strafkolonie.”
Because, for practical reasons, this thesis cannot include the entire story and all the
verbal associations that have been discovered, it seeks to develop the central images and
events of the narrative, beginning with the opening scene, through key associations in words
and verbal expressions. While some of these associations may appear exaggerated, this is
partly because the thesis seeks to utilize a writing method that looks to any and all possible
associations for inspiration. In much the same way, while many of the associations may not be
evident at first glance to a modern reader, it is in reading the Old Law of the Penal Colony that
historical and antiquated associations are often most relevant. Following the legal transition of
the Penal Colony in the narrative, particularly as it is described by the Officer to the Traveler,
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the images and events of the Old Law (Chaper 1) are presented separately from those of the
New Law (Chapter 2).
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Chapter I: In the Penal Colony, under the Old Law
“Modern man sees his relationship downward to the animal and to the machine”-Francis A. Schaeffer12
“Ein erstes Zeichen beginnender Erkenntnis ist der Wunsch zu sterben”-Franz Kafka13

Much of Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie”14 is devoted to a machine. Not only is it the
central instrument in the Penal Colony’s legal procedure under the Old Commandant, it is also
the main, and at times, only character in the story: the Officer’s detailed explanations of the
machine form the focal point of his presentation of the Penal Colony’s legal procedure to the
visiting Traveler and almost fully occupy the first half of the text. From the very beginning, the
Officer’s verbal explanations both underline and mimic, in this way, not only the mechanically
inhumane nature of the Penal Colony’s legal procedure, but also its strongly verbal quality: the
legal machine of the Penal Colony is an execution machine that is also a verbal construct; the
legal procedure is a verbal process, that not only figuratively seeks to eliminate all characters
from the Officer’s explanations, but it literally engraves its written laws into human bodies. The
legal procedure in the Penal Colony under the Old Law, embodied in the Officer’s overwhelming

12

Escape from Reason (26).

13

Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (2: 116).

14

The primary text used for the thesis and from which quotes are taken directly is in the original German and
found in the Kafka compilation Drucke zu Lebzeiten, compiled and edited by the widely-renowned Kafka scholars
Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch, and Gerhard Neumann. Henceforth, I will be referring to this actual text as “In der
Strafkolonie” and to the fictional images and events in the story as in the Penal Colony.
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verbal explanations of the Old Commandant’s inhumane writing machine, seems to develop out
of the figurative expression, “Nach dem Buchstaben des Gesetzes” (“to the letter of the law”).

I.1.The Law as a Machine
The Old Law of the Penal Colony is a machine that is also a verbal construct, one that
seeks to eliminate all other characters in the story or anything that might deviate from the
Officer’s explanations of the machine. Evidence of this can be found at the outset of the
Officer’s explanations in the beginning of the story, when the Traveler makes comments, not
directed to the machine, but to the uniforms that he and the Officer are wearing. The Officer
appears to understand these comments as nothing more than useless digression: “‘Diese
Uniformen sind doch für die Tropen zu schwer,’ sagte der Reisende, statt sich, wie es der
Offizier erwartet hatte, nach dem Apparat zu erkundigen. ‘Gewiss,’ sagte der Offizier […], ‘aber
sie bedeuten die Heimat; wir wollen nicht die Heimat verlieren. – Nun sehen Sie aber diesen
Apparat,’ […]” [emphasis added] (204). The Officer directs the Traveler’s attention to his
explanations of the machine and away from the cause of distraction, something he continues to
do throughout much of the text, especially with regard to the Condemned Man and his case.
When the Traveler finally manages to gain an explanation from the Officer concerning the
Condemned Man’s case, or the legal procedure behind the operation of the machine, the
Officer seems hurried in finishing it, forcing the focus back to the machine: “‘Ist nun alles
erklärt? Aber die Zeit vergeht […], und ich bin mit der Erklärung des Apparates noch nicht
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fertig.’ Er nötigte den Reisenden auf den Sessel nieder, trat wieder zu dem Apparat und begann
[…]” (213). As the Officer directs the Traveler’s attention away from the Condemned Man and
to his verbal explanations of the machine, he has gestured, not just to the machine itself, but to
the inhumane verbal construct that defines it. From the outset of the story in this way, the
Officer’s verbal explanations to the Traveler can be associated with Kafka’s literary text to the
reader. The machine, including all the legal structures and procedures in the Penal Colony, as
they are later explained by the Officer, might ultimately be understood, not only as a verbal
construct in the fictional sense, but as the actual verbal construct of the story. Much like the
Traveler, who listens to the Officer’s explanations and observes the machine in the Penal
Colony, the reader reads word associations that are “In der Strafkolonie.” These associations
begin in depicting the law as a machine.
When, in the opening line of the text, the Officer refers to the machine, saying: “Es ist
ein eigentümlicher Apparat” [emphasis added] (203), he seems to have verbally drawn
attention, not just to a machine, but to a type of legal system or to a system that is
fundamentally human. The term Apparat can be used, for instance, in an administrative or
political context: “ein Verwaltungsapparat/ein politischer Apparat,” and it might also refer to a
living, organ system, as in the compound noun “Herz-Kreislauf-Apparat.” Much like in the
Officer’s explanations of the law to the Traveler, such tension in the term Apparat might allow a
transition, in the reading of it, from human agencies and legal institutions to mechanical
instruments.
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Perhaps the clearest, and most direct, evidence of such a reading can be found in a
change in the word that refers to the machine in the text. In the first third of the story, it is
termed solely an Apparat. After the machine had been fully described by the Officer, and while
he begins to demonstrate its operation, the text transitions to the more clearly mechanical
term Maschine in referring to it: “Der Reisende hatte das Ohr zum Offizier geneigt und sah, die
Hände in den Rocktaschen, der Arbeit der Maschine zu” [emphasis added] (220). The text’s
transition from Apparat to Maschine, in naming the Penal Colony’s central legal agency under
the Old Law, appears to depict an inhumane legal transition that is also a verbal transformation
or a shift in the reading of words. The Old Law of the Penal Colony is a machine in the verbal
sense, and its structure, or connected parts, can also be observed in word associations.

I.2.The Structure of the Machine
The structure of the Penal Colony’s machine, as the Officer presents it, is a large, tripartite one, consisting of the Bett [bed], the Egge [harrow], and the Zeichner [drafter] (206).15
All three parts, though individually named and structurally distinct, are also connected in
multiple ways. The bed, upon which the Condemned Man lies, strapped down and naked, is
the lowest part of the structure. It is covered with a cotton material, that rolls and rotates the
body of the Condemned Man, and it is of the same size and chest-like shape as the upper

15

The term der Zeichner, like the drafter, typically refers to a type of human. Kafka’s text appears to reverse this
association, as it refers here to a part of a machine.
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drafter, to which it is connected with brass rods. Like the drafter, the bed also has its own
individual battery, in large part for controlling its quivering movements that coordinate with
those of the harrow. The harrow, which actually writes or engraves the law or legal text into
the entire body of the Condemned Man, is made out of glass and has many needles. It is
suspended between the bed and the drafter, to which it is connected by a steel band. The
drafter, which contains the legal documents of the Old Commandant and is ultimately
responsible for controlling the violent work of the harrow, appears to be the most impressive
mechanical structure of all the parts of the machine. It is an extremely large and complex gear
or wheel mechanism. Perhaps for this reason, among others, it is anointed, in words and
gesture, the most important part of the machine by the Officer in his explanations to the
Traveler: “‘Nun weiß ich schon alles,’ sagte der Reisende, als der Offizier wieder zu ihm
zurückkehrte. ‘Bis auf das Wichtigste,’ sagte dieser, ergriff den Reisenden am Arm und zeigte in
die Höhe: ‘Dort im Zeichner ist das Räderwerk […]’” [emphasis added] (217).
The importance of the drafter’s wheel mechanism, as indicated by the Officer in his
explanations to the Traveler, allows the wheel to nicely exemplify how the structure of the
Penal Colony’s legal machine might develop through verbal associations. And indeed, the
numerous legal terms that can be associated with Rad actually seem to mirror the many
connected “gears” or “wheels” of the drafter’s wheel mechanism. For instance, one term that
is closely related to Rad (wheel), and that is also scattered in various forms throughout the text,
is Kreis (circle). It is a term that can be used figuratively in referring to social or political groups:
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“ein politischer Kreis.” Thus, the circular formation of followers around the machine, during its
procedure in the old days, appears to develop out of the literal reading of a metaphor that
might refer to the followers as a group, der Gesellschaftskreis: “die Gesellschaft-kein hoher
Beamte durfte fehlen-ordnete sich um die Maschine” (225).16 If the followers of the Old Law
are a Kreis, in the verbal sense, they might also be a Rad: a circle is the form of a wheel.
Through the semantic chain Gesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad, the followers of the Old Law do not
just make the machine the center of their attention, nor does their behavior simply imitate
forms in the machine’s drafter. They are the forms that make up the drafter. Just as the Officer
attempts to do with the Traveler through his explanations, verbal connections within Kafka’s
text, such as Gesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad, might inform the reader of the range of ideas of the
Old Commandant, “seinen Gedankenkreis,”17 specifically as they relate to the parts that make
up the drafter. Just as the Old Commandant’s ideas dictated the building of a legal machine
with many gears or wheels,18 so too might verbal associations, such as GedankenkreisGesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad.
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Under the New Law, as the Officer anticipates it, this practice is also to be expected. The ladies of the New
Commandant will sit in a circle, as the Traveler’s judgment concerning the Old Law is questioned, a gesture that
might also mimic a metaphor that could refer to the “meeting” or “session” in which this will take place (eine
Sitzung): ”Und seine Damen werden im Kreis herumsitzen” [emphasis added] (229).
17

The Officer uses this phrase when referring, in the theoretical words of the New Commandant, to the Traveler’s
unfamiliarity with the Old Commandant and his thought patterns upon his arrival in the Penal Colony: “Sie kannten
den alten Kommandanten und seinen Gedankenkreis nicht” (228). The Officer, it appears, intends to remedy this
problem by informing the Traveler of these thought patterns.
18

“Dieser Apparat […] ist eine Erfindung unseres früheren Kommandanten” (205).
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The connection between the Old Commandant and the mechanical parts of the drafter
can perhaps be traced, more directly, through etymological connections within the term Rad.
In Middle High German, it appeared in the form rat (Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm
und Wilhelm Grimm volume 14, column 35)19 and could be associated, for this reason, with the
term Rat,20 a noun that can historically refer, among other things, to various types of authority
figures. It is, in a strict sense, an instruction or a directive to be followed: “im schärfsten sinne
die anweisung, der man zu folgen hat” (DW 14, 161).21 Read through the association Rat-Rad,
one that might originate in the historical, morphological transition rat-Rad, the Old
Commandant and his legal directives are the wheels or moving parts of the machine that is the
Old Law of the Penal Colony. This Law, as a machine, a symbol easily associated with efficiency
and power, combines all such directives, into one inhumane principle.

19

Henceforth, all references to Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm will be given as
follows (DW x,y) with ‘x’ referring to the respective volume and ‘y’ referring to the respective column in that
volume.
20

In New High German, Rad is also often phonetically indistinguishable from Rat. Perhaps Kafka, aware of the
phonetic similarity of Rad and Rat, allowed the associated meanings of each word to coalesce and intermingle.
21

Originally referring to the physical care from authorities to their subjects, the term Rat became associated with
the care from authority figures through their instructions or directives: “rat war die fürsorge des
geschlechtsoberhauptes durch anweisung und belehrung seiner geschlechtsgenossen.” Within this context, the
term Rat ultimately began to refer to the directives of authority figures themselves and only by extension to the
milder “proposal” or “suggestion” (DW 14, 161).
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I.3.One Principle: the Certainty of Guilt
The law or legal proceedings behind the machine and the specific case of the
Condemned Man are finally, if only briefly, explained by the Officer in response to the
Traveler’s insistent questioning. These proceedings are, however, much like the operation of
an efficient and powerful machine. The Officer, who is now the sole judge in the Penal Colony
because the Old Commandant has died, does not allow legal defense, and he makes judgments
according to one principle, that guilt is always certain. He says to the Traveler: “Der Grundsatz,
nachdem ich entscheide, ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” (212). The Officer’s principle of
judgment can be seen as the development of a certain semantic combination within the term
Schuld. It can refer, not just to a “[legal] guilt,” but to a “[moral] guilt” or to “sin”: “[Schuld]
steht gern in verbindung mit sünde” (DW 15, 879).22 If legal guilt is also sin, then it might be
original sin (Erbsünde) and, by definition, always certain.23 The case of the Condemned Man,
which consists in an unavoidable act of guilt and in the Officer’s immediate declaration of guilt,
seems to turn this verbal possibility into a legal principle.

22

The term Schuld originally referred to a favor and to the associated debt, in both the monetary and general
sense. It is within this context that it became associated, in the reverse, with an offense or a crime that demanded
vengeance or retribution: “ein begangenes unrecht, das wieder gut gemacht, gesühnt werden musz” (DW 15,
879).
23

The connection “sin”-“original sin” would have been one easily made by the Jewish Kafka in early twentieth
century Prague, writing in a German language, strongly rooted in the Western tradition and in Judeo-Christianity.
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I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case
The Officer quickly explains the case of the Condemned Man to the Traveler, shortly
after declaring his principle of judgment. According to the Officer, this case is as simple as all
other cases: “er ist so einfach, wie alle” (212):
Ein Hauptmann hat heute morgens die Anzeige erstattet, daβ dieser Mann, der
ihm als Diener zugeteilt ist und vor seiner Türe schläft, den Dienst verschlafen
hat. Er hat nämlich die Pflicht, bei jedem Stundenschlag aufzustehen und vor der
Tür des Hauptmanns zu salutieren. Gewiβ keine schwere Pflicht und eine
notwendige, denn er soll sowohl zur Bewachung als auch zur Bedienung frisch
bleiben. Der Hauptmann wollte in der gestrigen Nacht nachsehen, ob der Diener
seine Pflicht erfülle. Er öffnete Schlag zwei Uhr die Tür und fand ihn
zusammengekrümmt schlafen. Er holte die Reitpeitsche und schlug ihm über das
Gesicht. Statt nun aufzustehen und um Verzeihung zu bitten, faβte der Mann
seinen Herrn bei den Beinen, schüttelte ihn und rief: “Wirf die Peitsche weg,
oder ich fresse dich.”- Das ist der Sachverhalt. Der Hauptmann kam vor einer
Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf und anschließend gleich das Urteil.
Dann ließ ich dem Mann die Ketten anlegen. (212-213)
Both the development of the Condemned Man’s case and the Officer’s judgment concerning it
can be demonstrated as the product of a verbal process or reasoning. Both seem to originate,
not out of something within the case itself, but out of the language of the Officer’s guiding

34

principle. The overall sense is that this “simple case,” or the Condemned Man’s unavoidable
guilt and the Officer’s immediate judgment, flow out of a merging of associations or meanings
within the term Schuld. For example, historically the noun Schuld does not only refer to “guilt”
but can also be associated with Pflicht,24 the word that is used by the Officer in referring to the
duty of the Condemned Man. The Condemned Man’s guilt in attempting to fulfill his duty
might be certain because the word Schuld means both “duty” and “guilt.” This juxtaposition in
the word Schuld appears, at least partly, to explain the absurdly difficult responsibility and
failure of the Condemned Man to wake and salute on the hour, every hour during the night.
Regarding the Officer’s judgment of this case, the correlation between an accusation and a
declaration of guilt might be found in the Old German morphological association between the
two terms Anschuldigung and Schuld: a written accusation is a “schriftliche schult” (DW 15,
1884).25 A semantic equivalency between the two terms Anschuldigung and Schuld might be
derived from a historical, morphological one: Anschuldigung means Schuld because, in the past,
it might have appeared that way (schult). Much like a rigorous application of this verbal
principle to the term Schuld, the Officer accepts, without hesitation, the account of the captain
against the Condemned Man as a statement of his guilt, and he immediately writes his
sentence.

24

At its origin, the term Schuld first denoted a duty or a service to which one is bound: “was man soll oder schuldig
ist, eine verpflichtung oder eine leistung, wozu man verbunden ist” (DW 15, 1871).
25

In DW 15, 1884, this is illustrated by referencing the following quote from Spittendorf: “so solten schriftliche
schult und antwort gegen einander gehen” (67).
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Though perhaps ultimately a further development of the Officer’s principle of judgment,
read through associations in the term Schuld,26 the simplicity and specific details of the Officer’s
sentence in the case of the Condemned Man seem to develop, most directly, out of figurative
associations in the captain’s actual account of the crime. The verbal nature of the punishment
fitting the crime, in this “simple” case, seems hinted at in the Officer’s statement regarding his
sentencing: “Der Hauptmann kam vor einer Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf und
anschließend gleich das Urteil” [emphasis added] (213). Due to a certain double-meaning in the
term gleich, the Officer did not just write the judgment or sentence of the Condemned Man
“immediately” upon writing down the account of the captain, he also wrote both exactly the
same way or “identically.” And indeed, there seems to be a certain verbal equivalency between
the account of the captain, regarding the Condemned Man’s crime, and the Officer’s judgment
or sentencing of him. For example, historically and figuratively, “to fall asleep” or “to sleep”
carries the sense of “to die” or “to be dead.” Historically, the verb entschlafen literally means
“einschlafen,” yet figuratively it is synonymous with “sterben” (DW 3, 601). In a similar way,
the figurative phrase den letzten Schlaf tun means “tot sein.” Furthermore, because the noun
Schlag can historically refer, not only to a violent “strike,” but also to a “wunde” or a “wound”
(DW 15, 316),27 the implicit prepositional phrase that indicates when the Condemned Man falls

26

Within the western, Judeo-Christian language framework, for example, Schuld is easily associated with a type of
death sentence: “Denn der Tod ist der Sünde Sold” (Römer 6.23).
27

In Middle High German and in early New High German the word Schlag often carried a stronger meaning than it
does currently in New High German. It could refer not only to a “wound,” but to a “deadly wound” or to a deadly
wounding procedure, particularly with regard to animals: “das schlachten” (DW 15, 316).
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asleep or sleeps, “at the turn of the hour” (beim Stundenschlag), could also be interpreted as
with an hourly wound. Therefore, an implicit verbal form of the Condemned Man’s alleged
crime of falling asleep or sleeping at the turn of the hour, Er schläft beim Stundenschlag [ein],
also names and seems to determine the form of his punishment.28 Not only does he lie on the
ground, whipped in the face, but he will die [on a bed] with an hourly wound: “Die ersten sechs
Stunden lebt der Verurteilte fast wie früher, er leidet nur Schmerzen […] Wie still wird dann
aber der Mann um die sechste Stunde!” (219).29 According to a certain reading [and writing] of
this case, the Condemned Man’s crime warrants an immediate, and rather specific, death
sentence. Like all men under the Old Law, however, the Condemned Man will die under the
verbal process that defines the execution procedure of the Penal Colony.

I.5.The Law as an Execution
The Penal Colony’s execution procedure appears to develop, not only in the context of
one specific case, but also as a consequence of the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s overall
interpretation of the law. In the same way, the Old Law of the Penal Colony might be
embodied, not just in a machine, but in an execution machine because a reading of legal terms
dictates such an embodiment. For instance, the word Exekution, used by the narrator in the

28

The Condemned Man is found sleeping at exactly 2:00 a.m. (“Schlag zwei Uhr”), even though he is supposed to
stand and salute every hour, on the hour (“bei jedem Stundenschlag”). The Officer says: “[Der Hauptmann]
öffnete Schlag zwei Uhr die Tür und fand ihn zusammengekrümmt schlafen” (213).
29

The execution procedure, as the Officer fully describes it, is a twelve-hour procedure. The sixth-hour is the
turning point, in which the Condemned Man apparently begins to die.
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beginning of the story to signify the machine’s deadly function, a procedure which the French
speaking Officer will later present to the cultured Traveler (203), is derived from the Latin
ex(s)ecutio. Historically, or in French, it does not necessarily imply a “Hinrichtung” or a
“[deadly] execution.” It might simply denote the “Ausführung einer Anordnung” or the actual
“execution [of the law]” by an executive power (Duden: Das Herkunftswörterbuch).30 This
tension in the term Exekution, particularly through the literal German, allows the reader of it to
equate executive administration with a deadly execution. Because of such readings of legal
terms, the Old Law, in every legal case, appears to manifest itself in the form of an execution or
in an execution procedure.

I.6.The Execution Procedure
The language Kafka uses in “In der Strafkolonie” actually appears to mimic or to
anticipate the execution procedure of the Penal Colony, as it is most thoroughly described by
the Officer to the Traveler, soon after presenting to him the case of the Condemned Man. One
example can be found where the Officer explains the machine’s initial, preparatory operation,
immediately before the procedure begins. He says: “[I]st die Einstellung vollzogen, strafft sich
sofort dieses Stahlseil zu einer Stange. Und nun beginnt das Spiel” [emphasis added] (214). It
is not just the Officer, it seems, who describes the tightening of the machine’s parts before the

30

This reading is also indirectly possible through modern German. The term Die Exekutive refers to “the executive
authority [in government],” whereas the word that signifies the function of this authority, die Exekution, typically
refers to “[deadly] execution.”
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execution of the Condemned Man. The passage itself appears to perform the machine’s
operation for the reader. The constant repetition of the /sch/ and /s/ phonemes, if seemingly
playful and free, in connection with Spiel, actually seems to highlight the passage’s forcefully
connected and tightening verbal parts, especially with regard to the firmness of the /t/ and /p/
phonemes that directly follow in strafft, Stahlseil, Stange, and Spiel. Furthermore, the
connection between this preparatory operation, verbally set in motion by straffen, and the
ultimate function of the execution machine can be accomplished through word association,
namely in the verbs straffen (“to tighten”) and strafen (“to discipline” or “punish”). In the same
way verbally, the tightening of the machine’s parts prepares the way for the punishment of the
Condemned Man.
Another place in the text where Kafka’s word choice appears to mimic or to anticipate
the execution procedure of the Penal Colony is found where the Officer further describes the
punishment of the Condemned Man in the violent functioning of the machine’s harrow. The
Officer says: “Zitternd sticht sie ihre Spitzen in den Körper ein […]” [emphasis added] (215). The
connection between the sharp needles of the harrow, that pierce and then penetrate into the
body of the Condemned Man, and authority figures, like the Old Commandant and Officer of
the Penal Colony, can be traced through the word Spitzen, meaning “spikes” but also referring
to society’s “elite” or to “the heads of government.” The phonetics of the passage can also be
associated with the movements of the machine, as the Officer describes them. The repetitive
/z/, /s/, and /sch/ phonemes literally run “into the body” or “in den Körper” (“Zitternd sticht sie
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ihre Spitzen in den Körper ein”). In this way, the passage appears to anticipate the experiences
of the Condemned Man, both visually and phonetically, in that the reader reads and hears what
the Condemned Man will feel. Much like the Old Law of the Penal Colony, both passages
appear to convert the legal functions of authority into an execution procedure that punishes
with spikes, quivering repetitively as they stab the body. Most importantly, this Old Law or
execution procedure appears to develop, in the case of the reader of “In der Strafkolonie,” out
of a verbal text. In the same way in the Penal Colony, it ultimately originates in the legal
documents of the Old Commandant.

I.7.The Precious Legal Documents of the Old Commandant
The Old Law of the Penal Colony, as the Officer explains to the Traveler, is preserved in
the form of the Old Commandant’s legal documents. There are, however, clear hints in the
narrative that these contain more than simple laws or legal explanations. The Officer, for
example, handles them like a sacred relic: they are not to be touched by anyone, and they are
his most valuable possession. The Officer says to the Traveler: “[I]ch kann sie Ihnen aber leider
nicht in die Hand geben, sie sind das Teuerste, was ich habe” (217). Most tellingly perhaps, the
documents do not appear to contain a text in the traditional and written sense. The narrator
describes the appearance of one of them as the Traveler unsuccessfully attempts to decipher it:
“Der Reisende hätte gern etwas Anerkennendes gesagt, aber er sah nur labyrinthartige,
einander vielfachkreuzende Linien, die so dicht das Papier bedeckten, daß man nur mit Mühe
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die weißen Zwischenräume erkannte” (217). Its abstract image is clearly made up of lines, and
yet it is not linear, one that would seemingly allow it to be interpreted in different ways. Beate
Müller, for example, demonstrates one such possibility in her essay “Die Grausame Schrift.”
She differentiates in the legal documents of the Old Commandant both a written text and a
work of visual art: “[…] [sie gehören] gleich zwei Gattungen an–nämlich Text und Graphik”
(117), and she further identifies the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s reading of the law with the
artistic quality of the document’s image. Indeed, this connection is already hinted at in the
narrative, when the Officer refers to the documents with a term that denotes a type of
drawing: “Ich verwende noch die Zeichnungen des früheren Kommandanten” [emphasis added]
(217).
The indecipherable complexity of the Old Commandant’s legal documents might
originate in an attempt to associate different, possibly conflicting, meanings within the term
Zeichnung(en), used to name and describe them. Morphologically, the word Zeichnung can be
associated with a more general term for symbol that can also refer to a verbal sign, Zeichen,
and semantically, the two are indeed related. The verb form zeichnen, for example, can
historically signify, among other related concepts, both the writing of a verbal text and the
creation of an artistic drawing:
[M]it wort oder schriftlicher darstellung dinge, zustände, menschen, charaktere
beschreiben, schildern, etwas darlegen, auseinandersetzen: scribere [und] im
speciellen sinne zeichnen, d. h. linien und umrisse nach einem sichtbaren oder
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vorgestellten vorbilde auf papier oder eine andere unterlage bringen, so dasz ein
abbild entsteht. (DW 31, 492)
When approaching the text in this way, verbal associations in the term Zeichnung seem to
mirror the combination of the linear and figurative in the image of the documents and, at the
same time, explain the Officer’s otherwise absurd expectation that the Traveler read one of
them, as a clear text, although it appears to be an indecipherable work of art: “‘Lesen Sie,’ sagte
der Offizier. ‘Ich kann nicht,’ sagte der Reisende. ‘Es ist doch deutlich,’ sagte der Offizier. ‘Es
ist sehr kunstvoll,’ sagte der Reisende ausweichend, ‘aber ich kann es nicht entziffern’” (217).
The transition from an artistic drawing to a sacred text in the image of the documents
can be located, not only in their abstract complexity, but also, for example, in the word that
signifies the Old Commandant or their “drawer,” der Zeichner. It can be understood as a
reference to a type of godly figure. Just as the Old Law is rooted in the past, the word, if read
etymologically, can correspond to the more modern “Wundertäter” or “miracle-worker,” the
creator of signs and wonders (“zeichenære,” DW 31, 494).31 It is perhaps for this reason that
the Traveler assigns a type of godly perfection to the Old Commandant, immediately after
hearing that he is the creator of the artistic drawings: “‘Hat er denn alles in sich vereinigt? War

31

The verb form zeichnen can also refer to the miraculous actions of a godly figure: ein zeichen geben, a) von
göttlicher, überirdischer einwirkung, wunder thun.” It does this, while carrying the overall sense of expressing in
signs or making known with signs (DW 31, 488). In the more specific sense of “to mark with a sign,“ the term
zeichnen can also mean, however, “to mark [someone] with a sign“ (DW 31, 492). This latter reading might partly
explain why the drawings of the Old Commandant ultimately become marks on the skin of the Condemned Man.
See also Section I.10.Deciphering the Documents as Wounds (pg.47).
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er Soldat, Richter, Konstrukteur, Chemiker, Zeichner?’” [emphasis added] (211). The Traveler’s
expressed reverence for the Old Commandant, much like the Officer’s sacred handling of his
drawings, can be, it seems, partly explained due to this reading of one of the terms that names
or describes him, der Zeichner.32
In fact, several of the Officer’s references to the documents themselves, or to their
content, appear to identify them as types of scripture. When the Officer refers to the legal
document or law that is to be written onto the body of the Condemned Man, he says: “Dem
Verurteilten wird das Gebot, das er übertreten hat, mit der Egge auf den Leib geschrieben,”
[emphasis added] (210). The law, as Gebot, may recall, for example, the biblical zehn Gebote or
the Ten Commandments. Indeed, though in a strangely literal and combinatory sense, the
actual law that is to be written on the Condemned Man’s body, “Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten”
(210), seems to reference the First and Fifth Commandments, “Du sollst keine anderen Götter
neben mir haben” (2.Mose 20.3) and “Du sollst deinen Vater […] ehren […] (2.Mose 20.12).
Another term that is often used in “In der Strafkolonie” when referring to the
documents is Schrift. The Officer seems to use it in referencing both the document’s form and
content. He says to the Traveler, concerning it: “Es darf natürlich keine einfache Schrift sein
[…]” [emphasis added] (217). The word Schrift can refer to empirical writings and scientific
texts (“sämtliche Schriften Kants”), even to the most simple of manuscripts (“eine

32

Beate Müller traces this development, in a similar way, through the noun Schöpfer, referring to both an “artist”
and to “God” (117).
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Handschrift”). Yet, it can also refer to holy documents and religious writings: “die Heilige
Schrift.”33 For the reader, as well as the Officer, it is only natural that this document must not
be simple; the meaning of its name alone makes it this way.

I.8.Reading the Documents and Knowing Justice with Closed Eyes
The cause of the Traveler’s inability to read the law or legal document that the Officer
presents to him can ultimately be understood, therefore, as a false approach in deciphering a
sacred scrip[ture]. The Officer, for example, expects the Traveler to read the document or to
see it with his eyes, and he presents it to him from a reasonable distance, in this regard. He
says to the Traveler: “[…] ich zeige sie Ihnen aus dieser Entfernung, dann werden Sie alles gut
sehen können” [emphasis added] (217). The implication is that the Officer is going to hold the
document up to the Traveler, close enough that he can see it clearly, for he had just told the
Traveler that he cannot be allowed to touch it because it is too valuable. This fact, however,
coupled with an unavoidable ambiguity in the passage, namely through the phrase “aus dieser
Entfernung [zeigen],” allows it to be read in another sense, one that is inconsistent with the
Officer’s approach in regards the Traveler: distance is required to preserve the document, and
perhaps also for seeing it clearly. This juxtaposition in the Officer’s statement may be
explained, among other ways, through an ambiguity in the verb sehen, meaning both “to see”

33

Such a connection can also be traced through words that, though they are not explicitly mentioned in “In der
Strafkolonie,” clearly loom large in the text, such as das Wort, meaning simply “word” or “the Word” (“das Wort
Gottes”).
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and “to understand.”34 This possibility may be actualized in the verb’s associative movement
from simple physical impressions, contained in the phrase “mit den Augen sehen,” to greater
scientific perception and understanding, shown in figurative associations with verbs such as
wissen, erkennen, beurteilen (“Man muß die Dinge im Zusammenhang sehen”). And yet, it can
also refer to the spiritual insight of a Seher or Hellseher, a “seer, prophet, visionary.” The
Traveler might not be able to see the document better from a distance, and certainly not from a
great distance, but he would, according to this latter reading, understand it better. For this
reason, a verbal conflict in the verb sehen might dictate that the Traveler cannot decipher the
legal document of the Old Commandant because, under the Old Law of the Penal Colony, legal
documents are not seen [with the eyes]; they are understood, meditatively and with closed
eyes. This can be demonstrated, perhaps most clearly, in the Officer’s description of the old
days of the Penal Colony, when the execution procedure was still strongly supported or
followed:
Wie war die Exekution anders in früherer Zeit! Schon einen Tag vor der
Hinrichtung war das ganze Tal von Menschen überfüllt; alle kamen nur um zu
sehen […] Vor hunderten Augen- alle Zuschauer standen auf den Fußspitzen bis
dort zu den Anhöhen-wurde der Verurteilte vom Kommandanten selbst unter
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Kafka’s text also appears to play with different modes of physical sight. The Officer may hold the document up
to the Traveler from a distance, so that the Traveler does not lose sight of the entire document in the details. Such
an analysis goes beyond the language scope of the thesis, however, and into other twentieth century discourse.
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die Egge gelegt […] Und nun begann die Exekution! Kein Mißton störte die
Arbeit der Maschine. Manche sahen nun gar nicht mehr zu, sondern lagen mit
geschlossenen Augen im Sand; alle wußten: Jetzt geschieht Gerechtigkeit. (225226)
Many of the attendees at the execution, although seemingly coming just “to see” (“alle kamen
nur um zu sehen”) or “to watch,” ultimately came only “to understand” in another sense. They
lay down on their faces, and with closed eyes, they not only understood but knew that justice
was administered. Under the Old Law, as in the old days of the Penal Colony, followers
decipher legal documents and know justice with closed eyes or through a meditative ritual that
appears literalized in the Condemned Man’s deadly judgment.

I.9.The Undeclared Judgment of the Condemned Man
Although contained in the legal documents of the Old Commandant, the Condemned
Man’s actual judgment is not embodied in a verbal text, nor is the Condemned Man to be
verbally informed of it in any way. His judgment is an undeclared judgment that he will feel on
his body. This is perhaps most clearly depicted in the scene where the Condemned Man
illegally attempts to inform himself of the execution procedure during the Officer’s
explanations to the Traveler. The Soldier, who is charged with watching the Condemned Man
during the explanations, becomes sleepy and inattentive, upon which the Condemned Man
moves closer to the machine and attempts, like the Officer and Traveler, to observe the harrow:
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“[Der Verurteilte] hatte den verschlafenen Soldaten an der Kette ein wenig vorgezerrt und sich
auch über das Glas [der Egge] gebeugt. Man sah, wie er mit unsicheren Augen auch das suchte,
was die zwei Herren eben beobachtet hatten” (216). The Officer, in turn, alerts the Soldier by
throwing a clod of soil at him, and in response the Soldier, upon realizing what has happened,
digs his heels into the ground and violently pulls the Condemned Man back: “[Er] stemmte die
Füße mit den Absätzen in den Boden, riß den Verurteilten zurück, daß er gleich niederfiel, und
sah dann auf ihn hinunter, wie er sich wand und mit seinen Ketten klirrte” [emphasis added]
(216). In alerting the Soldier to prevent the Condemned Man from informing himself in any
way, the Officer’s actions remind the reader of his earlier declaration regarding the uselessness
of verbally informing the Condemned Man of his judgment prior to the execution. The Officer
says, in a French tongue that the Condemned Man cannot understand: “es wäre nutzlos, es ihm
zu verkünden. Er erfährt es ja auf seinem Leib” (211). Most importantly, the expressions used
to describe the Soldier, as he prepares to pull the Condemned Man back, actually appear to
mimic, and in some ways to determine, the events of the narrative. It would be useless to
inform the Condemned Man of his judgment, not simply because such a judgment cannot be
apprehended verbally or because the Condemned Man would not understand the Officer’s
French and responds better to physical force, but also, it seems, due to a reading of the words
in this scene. The noun Füße refers to anatomical “feet” but perhaps also to “metric feet” in
poetry (Versfüße). In a similar way, the noun Absätze can be read as human “heels” but also as
“paragraphs” in a written work. According to these readings, as the Soldier presses his feet and
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heels into the ground, he transforms the medium of language into an instrument of corporeal
punishment.

I.10.Deciphering the Documents as Wounds
The Old Law and legal documents of the Old Commandant are understood, not simply
with closed eyes, but in corporal punishment and ultimately in death. According to the Officer
it is only when the Condemned Man begins to die, that he finally understands: “Die ersten
sechs Stunden lebt der Verurteilte fast wie früher, er leidet nur Schmerzen […] Wie still wird
dann aber der Mann um die sechste Stunde! Verstand geht dem Blödesten auf” [emphasis
added] (219). Deciphering the script[ure] of the Old Commandant’s legal documents requires,
therefore, not so much mystical meditation, but corporal wounds. The Officer says to the
Traveler: “Sie haben gesehen, es ist nicht leicht, die Schrift mit den Augen zu entziffern; unser
Mann entziffert sie aber mit seinen Wunden” (219).
The term Schrift itself can be deciphered with wounds, particularly through indirect
associations in its verb form schreiben (“to write”). Stanley Corngold hints at this possibility in
analyzing a phrase of the Officer that refers to the wounded areas of the Condemned Man
(wundbeschriebene Stellen). The Officer uses this phrase during his description of the execution
machine’s cotton bedding. Preparing for the script[ure] to sink in ever more deeply, the cotton
bedding stops the bleeding on places of the man’s body that have been written sore with
wounds: “Inzwischen legen sich die wundbeschriebenen Stellen auf die Watte, welche infolge
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der besonderen Präparierung sofort die Blutung stillt und zu neuer Vertiefung der Schrift
vorbereitet” [emphasis added] (218-219). Corngold notes that the phrase wundbeschriebene
Stellen (“places written sore”) in Kafka’s narrative develops out of a phonetic association with
the familiar phrase wundgeriebene Stellen (“places rubbed sore”):
“[…] Kafka has invented a German phrase, wundbeschriebene Stellen. German
has a similar- sounding phrase, the familiar expression wundgeriebene Stellen,
which means, literally, “places [on the body]” (Stellen) that have been “rubbed”
(gerieben) “sore” (wund). Kafka uses the phonic resemblance between gerieben
(rubbed) and beschrieben (described, “be-written”) to indicate the wounds that
the writing inflicts.” (Corngold, Kafka’s Collected Stories 44)
In much the same way, the term wundschreiben, implied in Kafka’s use of the phrase
wundbeschriebene Stellen, might develop out of a verbal process that points to the writing
procedure in the fictional narrative. Like the operation of the execution machine that combines
a writing procedure and a slow, wounding procedure, the term appears to develop out of a
verbal process that adds wund (“wound”) to a verb that already creates friction or rubs [the
skin], schreiben. The term schreiben can refer, in this way, to a type of inscribing, a writing with
wounds that closely resembles the writing procedure in the Penal Colony.35

35

The most direct connection between the term schreiben and the writing of a scripture as wounds can be found
historically in figurative expressions, particularly in those of Judeo-Christianity. If read literally, these figures
express that the Heilige Schrift should be written through the human body. In the Bible, God says to the people of
Israel, for example: “Ich will mein Gesetz geben in ihren Sinn, und in ihr Herz will ich es schreiben […]” (Hebräer 8,
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The further details of this writing procedure appears traceable, in part, through a term
that generally refers to writing as a type of inscribing, gravieren (“to engrave”).36 It can mean
to engrave an object, not only with an artistic drawing or with intricate patterns, but with the
verbal signs of a Schrift: “eine zeichnung, ein ornament oder schriftzeichen in [etwas]
einschneiden, eingraben” (DW 8, 2236). The same verb form also carries the historical sense of
burdening a person with guilt or with a judgment: “allgemein 'belasten', mit einem
gerichtsurteil, einer schuld […]” (DW 8, 2235).37 In this way, a sentence historically implicit in
the Officer’s judgment of the Condemned Man under the Old Law, such as Der Mann wurde mit
einem Urteil graviert (“The man was burdened with a judgment”),38 could be interpreted as
“The man was inscribed with a judgment.” This interpretation might partly explain why the
Condemned Man literally carries his judgment as a Schrift of intricate patterns, inscribed into
his body. Explaining this judgment to the Traveler, the Officer describes the Schrift as follows:
“Es darf natürlich keine einfache Schrift sein; sie soll ja nicht sofort töten […] Es müssen also
viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib nur
in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” (218). In this way,

10). It is possible that the violent writing procedure of Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” developed out of a literal
reading of such figures.
36

Detlef Kremer has associated the verb schreiben, through the Greek graphein, with eingravieren: “Der
Zusammenhang von ‘graben’ und ‘schreiben’ ist über das griechische ‘graphein’ etymologisch möglich, Schreiben
ist ein Vorgang des Eingravierens” (141).
37

This is a legal variation of the more general meaning of the term gravieren: “to lay a burden on somebody” or

“to burden somebody” (“jem. etwas zur last legen, jem. (mit etw.) belasten,” DW 8, 2235).
38

See Section I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case (pg.33).
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the language that is “In der Strafkolonie,” like the script[ure] of the Penal Colony under the Old
Law, can be read as words that are wounds.39 It is these wounds that seem to ultimately
communicate the legal message of the Old Commandant, and yet the Officer’s explanations or
his words appear, on the other hand, powerless to convey it. In this way, the Officer’s
explanations of the Old Law to the Traveler actually form the axis around which the Penal
Colony transitions to the New Law.

39

A similar connection can be found, for example, between a song and suffering. Though not explicitly found in “In
der Strafkolonie,” this is a connection that Kafka appears to make, though in the reverse, in a personal confession
to his friend Milena Jesenskà: “Niemand singt so rein als die, welche in der tiefsten Hölle sind” (Briefe 1918 318).
The connection Kafka appears to make between suffering and a song just as easily could have been inspired by the
verbal association Leid/Lied, as it could have been a product of his overall experience as a writer. In fact, as
Stanley Corngold has critically noted, Edwin and Willa Muir, greatly respected in the first half of the twentieth
century, but also often blamed for taking liberties in Kafka translation, must have recognized this possibility and
translated Lcentury, but also often blamed for taking liberties in Kafka translation, must have recognized this
possibility and translated Leid as “song” in their 1938 version of Kafka’s Amerika (Lambent Traces 183).
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Chapter II: In the Penal Colony, under the New Law
“Die Lüge wird zur Weltordnung gemacht”- Franz Kafka40
“You might think love of humanity in general was safe, but it is not. If you leave out justice you will find yourself
breaking agreements and faking evidence in trials ‘for the sake of humanity,’ and become in the end a cruel and
treacherous man”- C.S. Lewis41

The New Law of the Penal Colony, under the authority of the New Commandant, is a
human law that ultimately manifests itself in the destruction of the inhumane machine. The
circumstances that surround the destruction of the machine can be seen as the ultimate
consequence and literal rendering of the multitude of figurative frictions, breaks, or tears in the
Old Law, as they are found, and appear to originate, in the Officer’s explanations to the Traveler
or in verbal utterances of the Old Law. Contradictory expressions, like divisions in the Old
Commandant’s authority and judgment or the many heads of the court, seem to manifest
themselves as breaks in the actual structure and operation of the Old Commandant’s execution
machine or, by extension, as tears in the physical body of the Officer himself. Under the New
Law, men figuratively and literally “break the law” (das Gesetz brechen).

40

Der Proceß (233).

41

Mere Christianity (24).
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II.1.The Explanations of the Officer
The transition from the Old Law to the New Law appears to originate in the Officer’s
explanations to the Traveler. There are numerous occurrences during these explanations that
uniquely correspond to the operation of the Old Commandant’s execution machine as it writes
its script[ure] on the body of the Condemned Man. These parallels, however, only serve to
strengthen the impression that this New Law is fully different than the one that preceded it. It
is expressed as words to the Traveler, not impressed as wounds on the body of the Condemned
Man. One of these parallels between the Old Law and the New Law can be found where the
narrator refers to the Officer’s readiness to provide the Traveler with the most thorough
explanations of the machine and its operation. The narrator says: [Der Offizier] beugte sich
freundlich zu dem Reisenden vor, bereit zu den umfassendsten Erklärungen” [emphasis added]
(214). The adjective umfassendste, which in this case defines the Officer’s planned
explanations as “most comprehensive,” also carries the sense of “touching” and of “encircling.”
The image of the Officer, presented here, potentially corresponds exactly to the planned
execution procedure of the Penal Colony’s legal machine, as the Officer describes it. Its
script[ure] is to be written on, and around, the entire body of the Condemned Man: “Es müssen
also viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib
nur in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” (218).
The Officer’s explanations, however, are not written on the physical body of the
Traveler, the way the script[ure] is to be written on the physical body of the Condemned Man.
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This may be explained, in part, through a historic shift within the term that names the Officer’s
explanations. Etymologically, the word Erklärung is related to the noun Klärung and to the verb
klären, meaning “to purify” or “to clarify” in both the literal and figurative sense. Within this
context, the word Erklärung could refer to a “Verklärung” (DW 3, 876),42 or through the Latin to
the literal “transfiguratio” [emphasis added] (DW 25, 654).43 And yet currently, it
predominately denotes a type of verbal expression or “explanation.” Indeed, when the Officer
explains, to the Traveler, one of the decisive moments surrounding the transfiguration of the
Condemned Man under the Old Law, he appears to do so through this verbal transition. The
Officer says: “Wie nahmen wir alle den Ausdruck der Verklärung von dem gemarterten Gesicht
[…]” [emphasis added] (216). The Condemned Man’s Verklärung (“transfiguration”) is no
Ausdruck der Verklärung (“expression of transfiguration”), much less the Officer’s Erklärung
(“explanation”). The shift from the Old Law, or from the full transfiguration of the Condemned
Man’s physical body in the reading of a script[ure], to the New Law, or to the Officer’s verbal
explanations of this transformation to the Traveler, might be a transition in how the term
Erklärung is read: from the literal, umfassendste Verklärung to a figurative Erklärung.44

42

Under “Erklärung,” the DW makes reference to “Keisersb. bilg. 217” (Geiler von Keisersberg, Christenlich
bilgerschafft zum ewige[n] vatterla[n]d…, 1512, 217) quoting the following in order to demonstrate a crossreferencing between Erklärung and Verklärung: “die erklerung Christi uf dem berg Tabor.”
43

44

A Latin reading is possible here because the Officer’s explanations are not in German but in French (207).

There are many other associations with the term Erklärung that appear to illuminate, in their own unique way,
many of the other important images and events of “In der Strafkolonie.” While they cannot all be addressed in this
paper, one that is particularly relevant to the above discussion involves the noun der Eindruck. Much like the
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II.2.Persuasive, in Part, but No Power
According to the Officer, the problem with his explanations is that they are without
power. When speaking to the Traveler confidentially about the present reality of the Penal
Colony and general difficulty in maintaining its execution machine, the Officer says to the
Traveler: “Die Überzeugungskraft des alten Kommandanten habe ich zum Teil, aber seine
Macht fehlt mir ganz” [emphasis added] (224). The Überzeugungskraft, that the Officer still at
least partly possesses, potentially refers, not just to “persuasiveness” in speech or argument,
but also to “power of persuasion,” even, in a certain literal sense, power that persuades
(“Überzeugungskraft”). In this way, the Old Law and execution machine, which convince with
ruthless power, is an image that develops out of a certain reading of this term. 45 On the other
hand, when the Officer admits that he lacks the Old Commandant’s power, he might do so
because another reading of the same term, in over-emphasizing “Überzeugung(s-),” might lose
sight of its root, “-kraft.” Like the Officer and his explanations to the Traveler under the New
Law, this word is full of conviction and intent on persuasion, but with no power; it is, quite
literally, unconvincing. On the semantic level, the reader shares the Officer’s surprised
recognition at the end of the story, as he realizes that he has not convinced the Traveler and

transition from the Old Law to the New Law of the Penal Colony, a figurative Ausdruck (“expression”) excludes a
literal Eindruck (“impression”).
45

The image in the text that seems to develop, most directly, out of this and other associations in the term
Überzeugungskraft can be found right before the planned execution, when the Soldier, at the command of the
Officer, forcefully cuts the “tattered clothing” (Zeug) off the Condemned Man’s body and lifts him over it, implicitly
“über das Zeug” (220). According to a certain literal reading, the Officer has convinced the Condemned Man of the
Law or Truth in the fullest sense of the word: “Er hat ihn überzeugt.”
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that the Traveler will not follow the Old Commandant’s legal system: “‘Das Verfahren hat Sie
also nicht überzeugt,’ sagte er für sich” (236). In a play on words, the Traveler might “hear” the
words of the Officer but, unlike the Condemned Man under the Old Law, he will surely not
“obey” him, the reality of which can be read in the etymological split between hören and
gehorchen (DW 5, 2502).46 In the same way, he might even “understand” the words of the
Officer, but he certainly will not “follow” the Old Commandant or the procedural demands of
the machine, the possibility of which can be traced through an ambiguity in the verb folgen.47
The full transition to the New Law of the Penal Colony might develop out of conflicts within
such terms: in German, as in English, for example, following verbal explanations of the Old Law
is not following the Old Law. The New Law is, therefore, a type of verbal rebellion that breaks
the law. Originating in the Officer’s explanations to the Traveler, the New Law consists in the
verbal expressions of [ex-] followers, voicing untruths or contradictions.

46

The term gehorchen meant “to hear” or “to listen attentively” (“hören, aufmerksam hören,” DW 5, 2501) before
taking on its current meaning “to obey” (DW 5, 2502). The verb horchen means “to listen attentively,” though
historically it could have come close to gehorchen in its current usage “to obey”: “horchen rührt
an gehorchen, oder ist ihm in einigen stellen geradezu gleich” (DW 10, 1803). The verb hören, though similar in
appearance and clearly related to both gehorchen and horchen, historically contains little traces of the meaning “to
obey” and currently means simply “to hear” (DW 10, 1806-1812). It is possible that the Traveler’s inability to obey
the Old Law in hearing about it from the Officer is rooted in this verbal separation between gehorchen and hören.
47

The Officer says to the Traveler, for example: “Ich will nämlich den Apparat zuerst beschreiben und dann erst die
Prozedur selbst ausführen lassen. Sie werden ihr dann besser folgen können” [emphasis added] (207).
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II.3.Listening to the [Ex-] Followers in the Teahouse
According to the Officer, the consequence of his powerless and unconvincing
explanations is that open followers of the Old Commandant have diminished considerably.
They will no longer admit their allegiance and can instead be found in the teahouse voicing
verbal expressions that are nothing more than contradictory or ambiguous utterances. He says
to the Traveler:
[I]nfolgedessen haben sich die Anhänger verkrochen, es gibt noch viele, aber
keiner gesteht es ein. Wenn Sie heute, also an einem Hinrichtungstag, ins
Teehaus gehen und herumhorchen, werden Sie vielleicht nur zweideutige
Äußerungen hören. Das sind lauter Anhänger, aber unter dem gegenwärtigen
Kommandanten und bei seinen gegenwärtigen Anschauungen für mich ganz
unbrauchbar. [emphasis added] (224)
The followers’ change in behavior, as the Officer has described it, seems to be located in the
language of the expression that the Officer uses in defining them. The phrase lauter Anhänger,
which defines them as “simply followers,” might be perceived in different ways as it would be
articulated. Through terminal devoicing, the phrase lauter Anhänger might actually signify
lautere Anhänger: “pure and clear followers,” in the moral and linguistic sense.48 For the same

48

In DW, there are numerous definitions and explanations for the adverb “lauter.” In the given context, the 11th
entry in particular seems of interest: “aus dem begriff des reinen in den des sündefreien umschlagend […] aber
auch andererseits des klaren und deutlichen, besonders in bezug auf mündlich und schriftlich geäuszertes” (12,
382).
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reason of terminal devoicing, the phrase that is actually articulated, though one means to say
lautere or even lauter Anhänger, may be laute Anhänger: “loud followers,” also carrying the
sense of “followers that speak.” 49 Consistent with the Officer’s description, the followers of
the Old Law in the teahouse are no longer pure followers, and they no longer unambiguously
express their allegiance because, according to a phonetic transition through terminal devoicing
(lautere-lauter-laute), the followers in the teahouse are no longer “pure and clear followers”
(lautere Anhänger). They are simply “loud followers” or “followers that speak” (laute
Anhänger), voicing verbal expressions that must be contradictory or ambiguous.
The Officer associates the ambiguous expressions of the followers that are heard in the
teahouse with something essential to the nature of the New Commandant and his influences.
In the same way, the reader might recognize this in interpreting his name, der gegenwärtige
Kommandant. For instance, the word Gegenwart is related to the noun Gegner and could be
used, historically, in legal and communicative contexts, describing oppositional parties and
verbal attacks: “wie da die gegner gegen einander handeln, redden […], so hiesz diesz
entgegenstehen beider ihre gegenwart” [emphasis added] (DW 5, 2285).50 In this way, the
gegenwärtige Kommandant or the “current commandant” can also be read as the “oppositional

49

In DW, there are numerous definitions and explanations for the adverb “laut.” In the given context, the 5th entry
seems of particular interest: “laut heiszt auch nur ausgesprochen, im gegensatz des bloszen denkens oder
stummen wissens” (DW 12, 368).
50

This legal sense of the term Gegenwart was derived from the original sense of a “hostile confrontation”: “die
ursprüngliche bed. eines feindlichen entgegenstehens, die uns in widerwärtig noch anklingt […]” (DW 5, 2285).

58

and contradictory commandant.” The oppositional influence of the New Commandant of the
Penal Colony manifests itself, quite literally, in contradictory expressions. Like those of the
Condemned Man, when allowed to speak, the verbal expressions of followers, under the New
Commandant, cannot be truthful in the unambiguous sense.

II.4.The Lies of the Condemned Man
When the Officer refers theoretically to the consequences of interrogating the
Condemned Man before convicting him, or of allowing him the opportunity to speak on his
behalf, he says that the content of the Condemned Man’s speech would be nothing but a
network of confusion and lies: “Hätte ich den Mann zuerst vorgerufen und ausgefragt, so wäre
nur Verwirrung entstanden. Er hätte gelogen, hätte, wenn es mir gelungen wäre, die Lügen zu
widerlegen, diese durch neue Lügen ersetzt und so fort” (213). The Officer’s presumption of
lying on the part of the Condemned Man can, perhaps, partly be explained through associations
within the term liegen. Historically, it was often figuratively associated, in various ways, with
death. The double-verb construction schlafen-liegen, for example, could have meant “to be
dead” (“todt sein,” DW 12, 1002). Yet, the verb lügen (“to tell lies”) can also appear, for
example, in the Middle High German infinitive and in certain conjugations, in the same form as
the current liegen: “gott ist nicht ein mensch, das er liege” (DW 12, 1273).51 This apparent
relationship between liegen and lügen might give the impression that the Condemned Man,

51

4 Mos. 23, 19 (DW 12, 1273).
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who physically lies and dies [on a bed], under the Old Law, must verbally lie under the New
Law.52
The reason for the lies or confusion, with regard to the Officer as interrogator or
questioner, can similarly be traced through an apparent ambiguity in the verb, besides
ausfragen, that names his interrogation or his act of questioning: Verhör or verhören.53 A
negating effect in the prefix ver (verhören) might define the Officer’s behavior under the Old
Law, ignoring or not hearing the pleas of the Condemned Man. However, for a similar reason, it
can also mean to hear falsely (“falsch, unrichtig hören”), currently seen exclusively in the
reflexive “sich verhören” (DW 25, 584). From this verbal perspective, like that of the Officer’s,
it is to be expected that confusion and lies would be the only conceivable outcome in an
interrogation of the Condemned Man. If he were free to speak, or to act, that speech must be
untrue and those actions lawless. Under the New Law, in which the Condemned Man is freed,
men break the law.

52

For a further analysis of the Condemned Man’s death on a bed, particularly as it can be traced through figurative
associations within the verb schlafen, see also I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case (pg.33).
53

In the theoretical words of the Traveler, describing the legal procedure in his home country, the Officer
expresses what would be this interrogative aspect of the New Law of the Penal Colony: “Bei uns wird der
Angeklagte vor dem Urteil verhört” [emphasis added] (229).
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II.5.The Human(e) Ideals of the Traveler
The transition from the Old Law to the New Law in the Penal Colony is ultimately the
transition from a mechanical law to a human law. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than
at the end of the story, when the Officer frees the Condemned Man, shortly before the
machine self-destructs: “‘Du bist frei,’ sagte der Offizier zum Verurteilten […] Zum erstenmal
bekam das Gesicht des Verurteilten wirkliches Leben” (237). The origins of this transition can
be located, however, much earlier in a verbal shift, hinted at in the thoughts of the Traveler
regarding the Old Law. When the Traveler privately considers his role in intervening against the
Old Law’s legal procedure, he thinks to himself: “Die Ungerechtigkeit des Verfahrens und die
Unmenschlichkeit der Exekution war zweifellos” (222). Though in a more specific form, the
Traveler’s thoughts have expressed exactly what the Officer had voiced earlier, when defining
his principle of judgment under the Old Law: “Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” (212). The
difference appears to lie in the Traveler’s specific interpretation of an otherwise general
concept: he assigns undeniable guilt, not to everything, or to men as the Officer does, but to a
machine. Ultimately, the Traveler’s ability to define the machine’s procedure as inhumane, and
to absolutely justify its replacement with a human one, is the result of his understanding of the
law, one that might develop out of an opposition in the terms unmenschlich and menschlich.
Just as there is nothing inherently violent in the term Exekution, as demonstrated earlier,54 the
adjective unmenschlich, while typically signifying “inhumane,” actually only negates the human

54

See Section I.5.The Law as an Execution (pg.36).
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quality of its root, Mensch. Literally and historically, it simply denotes a non-human or nothuman quality: “nichtmenschlich” (DW 24, 1176). In this way, the otherwise accusatory
expression of the Traveler, “die Unmenschlichkeit der Exekution ist zweifellos,” could be
interpreted as the executive procedures are undoubtedly not-human, an interpretation that
might simply express the undeniably authoritative, abstract, and transcendent nature of the
law or the not-human quality of a machine. That which would assign a “cruel” or “barbarous”
element to the term unmenschlich is, from this perspective, only a secondary derivative or
interpretive possibility, one that is nonetheless unavoidable in the typical or modern reading of
it. For both the Officer of the Penal Colony and the reader of “In der Strafkolonie,” an inhuman
law must also be inhumane. In the same way but in the reverse, a law that is menschlich,
according to the Traveler, is not just one that is “humane,” it must also be “human,” a transition
or reading that is, on the other hand, foreign to the nature of a transcendent law or to the
structure and operation of a machine. Under the present authority and practice of the New
Commandant and modern Traveler, the law is interpreted as a human law, embodied in the
form of a human legal apparatus.

II.6.The Human Apparatus
The reversal of the Old Law from a mechanical law to a human law in the Penal Colony
can be seen, perhaps most directly, in places where certain human functions in the machine
strangely break with its mechanical and deadly operation. While these might serve to further
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highlight the machine’s brutality, they also seem to hint at an equally extreme and potentially
destructive transformation in its structure and operation. Under the New Law, the machine
and its brutally operating parts appear to constitute a human legal apparatus of grossly
functioning men. The execution machine, for instance, does not simply stab the naked
Condemned Man. According to a figurative reading, it might clothe him in an absurd fashion:
the script that is written as wounds on the Condemned Man’s body is expressed, by the Officer,
in figures that signify clothes, consisting wholly in extensive and intricate decorations. The
Officer says to the Traveler: “Es müssen also viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift
umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib nur in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige
Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” [emphasis added] (218). The image of the script as
clothing decorations may develop, in part, out of the word that names the sharp, writing
instruments of the machine. The Spitzen can be read, not just as “needles,” but also as a type
of decorative cloth with intricate patterns (“lace”). One of the most important functions of the
execution machine, die Spitzen verzieren den Körper (“the needles decorate the body”), might
develop as an outcome of this alternative reading. The Spitzen of the machine place extensive
and intricate decorative patterns on the body, not because they are sharp needles, but because
they are lace. As already hinted at in the Officer’s description of the image on the body of the
Condemned Man, the transition from a dead body, naked and rent with wounds, to a living
body, clothed and blanketed in ornament, might be the result of a reading of a word that
names specific structures of the machine.
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The clearest image of this actual transition in the law seems to be hinted at in a
description of the Officer’s clothes. The Officer, who like the machine is an embodiment of the
law, is a human, dressed in decorated military garb. Most tellingly perhaps, in one of the few
moments when the Traveler’s admiration for the Officer increases, his focus remains almost
entirely on this uniform:
[…] die Sonne verfing sich allzustark in dem schattenlosen Tal, man konnte
schwer seine Gedanken sammeln. Um so bewundernswerter erschien ihm der
Offizier, der im engen, parademäßigen, mit Epauletten beschwerten, mit
Schnürren behängten Waffenrock so eifrig seine Sache erklärte […] (206)
Indeed, the Officer’s decorated uniform, as admired by the Traveler, might partly originate in a
creative manipulation and interpretation of his linguistic body or his name, Offizier (“an officer,
whose glory consists in decorations”).55
Just as the Officer’s legal procedure does not simply stab the Condemned Man but
might clothe him, it also does not simply kill him. One of the most important aspects of its
operation strangely consists, for instance, in feeding him. The Condemned Man can eat
whenever he desires, during the execution. The Officer says to the Traveler: “Hier in diesen
elektrisch geheizten Napf am Kopfende wird warmer Reisbrei gelegt, aus dem der Mann, wenn
er Lust hat, nehmen kann […]” (219). This function of the machine and the behavior it allows

55

The noun Zier historically refers to “glanz, schönheit, herrlichkeit, pracht, schmuck” (DW 31, 1140).
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curiously imitates, to some degree, a particularly grotesque practice of the New Commandant
and seems to represent one of the primary activities of freed men under his influence. The
operation of the machine, for example, is delayed because the Condemned Man was stuffed
full of sweets by the ladies of the New Commandant and consequently throws up on the
machine. After the Condemned Man had fully recovered, during this delay, he instinctively
reaches for the food, immediately as it is made available to him: “Der Soldat hatte die
Reinigungsarbeit beendet und jetzt noch aus einer Büchse Reisbrei in den Napf geschüttet.
Kaum merkte dies der Verurteilte, der sich schon vollständig erholt zu haben schien, als er mit
der Zunge nach dem Brei zu schnappen begann” (226-227). Such images of eating in the Penal
Colony might be explained, among other ways, through the reading of a term the Officer often
uses in referring to the law, Gericht. It carries the sense, not just of the “court,” or apparatus of
legal judgment, but also of a “dish [of food].” According to this reading, the court of the Penal
Colony might be something, not under which men are brutally judged, but around which men
grossly eat. In the same way verbally, the operation of the legal apparatus in the current Penal
Colony consists in bodily functions and human behavior or of the functions and judgments of
human authorities.
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II.7.The Many Heads of the Court
The human legal apparatus of the Penal Colony also manifests itself in an undermining
of the Old Commandant’s singular authority and principle of judgment. Certain confessions and
inconsistencies in the Officer’s statement on judgment point to this:56
Ich bin hier in der Strafkolonie zum Richter bestellt. Trotz meiner Jugend. Denn
ich stand auch dem früheren Kommandanten in allen Strafsachen zur Seite und
kenne auch den Apparat am besten. Der Grundsatz, nach dem ich entscheide,
ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos. Andere Gerichte können diesen Grundsatz
nicht befolgen, denn sie sind vielköpfig und haben auch noch höhere Gerichte
über sich. Das ist hier nicht der Fall, oder war es wenigstens nicht beim früheren
Kommandanten. Der neue hat allerdings schon Lust gezeigt, in mein Gericht sich
einzumischen, es ist mir aber bisher gelungen, ihn abzuwehren, und wird mir
auch weiter gelingen. (212)
Although confident in his claims that the Old Commandant’s principle of judgment can be
followed in the current Penal Colony because the court does not consist of various authorities
and is not subject to higher courts, the Officer also appears to confess a fair amount of
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The Officer’s statement on judgment is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.3.One Principle: The Certainty of Guilt
(pg.32). In this section, the Officer is presented as the sole authority or judge with one principle under which he
judges a legal case in the Penal Colony: the certainty of guilt.
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uncertainty in this regard. He can only be certain that this was the case in the past and under
the direct leadership of the Old Commandant.
The Officer’s uncertainties appear to be grounded in the current, divided structure of
the court, which can be demonstrated through apparent contradictions in the Officer’s
statements. For example, the Officer has not only been appointed judge in the Penal Colony by
a higher authority, his failure to actually name this authority also leaves open the possibility
that some other, higher authority, besides the Old Commandant, has appointed him.
Furthermore, an apparent contradiction in the Officer’s statement on the principle of judgment
might actually separate his authority, in matters of judgment, from the higher authority that
has appointed him. Instead of declaring the Old Commandant’s principle of judgment, as it
seems he intends to do, the Officer announces, in fact, his principle: “Der Grundsatz, nach dem
ich entscheide, ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” [emphasis added] (212). Though contrary
to his claims, the Officer’s court, under the New Law and influence of the New Commandant, is
subject to higher courts, and it consists of various authorities, only one of which is the Officer.
When the Officer describes the actual operation of this court in the simple case of the
Condemned Man, subtle word associations also seem to contradict his closing assertion that
the New Commandant and his many-headed court have not yet succeeded, and perhaps never
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will succeed, in influencing his.57 The Officer says: “Ein Hauptmann hat heute morgens die
Anzeige erstattet, daβ dieser Mann, der ihm als Diener zugeteilt ist und vor seiner Türe schläft,
den Dienst verschlafen hat […] [Er] kam vor einer Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf
und anschließend gleich das Urteil [emphasis added] (212-213). If it is true, as the Officer
claims, that other courts of law, or the New Commandant’s courts of law, consist of many
authorities or are “vielköpfig,” so too is his law, according to this description. A “Hauptmann”
is the one who experienced the violation by the servant or Condemned Man, issued the charges
against him and brought them to the Officer. The term Haupt literally means “der Kopf” or “the
human head” and seems to suggest that other men with heads or other heads are involved in
the Officer’s court and not just one, as he claims. Under the New Law and influence of the New
Commandant, the court of the Penal Colony is no longer a court of one authority with one legal
judgment. As we will see, it is a court of many men with differing opinions.58
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The case of the Condemned Man is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple
Case (pg.33). In this case, the Condemned Man is found sleeping, although he is required to stand and salute. The
case is presented to the Officer, and the Officer immediately sentences the Condemned Man to death.
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Historically, the term vielköpfig was often used in pejoratively describing the opinions of the masses and has also
often been used together with figures of animals or monstrosities. In this sense, a many-headed legal court and its
many judgments might be like an animalistic mob or a monstrous horde: “so wird das volk, der grosze haufe, das
'publikum,’ der pöbel ein vielköpfig thier, ungeheuer u. ä. genannt […]” (the quote makes reference to “Horaz,
epist. 1, 1, 76,” DW 26, 193). This verbal coupling within the adjective might explain the second crime of the
Condemned Man. He not only rebels against his captain’s orders and judgment, he literally threatens to kill him by
eating him alive as a vicious animal would: “‘Wirf die Peitsche weg, oder ich fresse dich”’ [emphasis added] (213).
Like the threat of the Condemned Man, the term vielköpfig perhaps most clearly and grotesquely anticipates the
lawless judgments of men under the New Law.
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II.8.The Traveler’s Authority and Judgment
The Traveler seems to function as a representative of the new authorities in the New
Commandant’s court, evidenced in the nature of his authority and legal judgment. He judges,
not as a superior authority, but as a man with an opinion, a development that seems to
originate in a reversal in how the Old Law is understood or out of a reversed reading of the law,
“Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten” (“Honor thy superiors,” 210). Unlike the Condemned Man under
the Old Law, the Traveler only appears to understand it in obeying the forceful commands and
physical demands of his superior Officer. When, for example, the Traveler learns from the
Officer that the Condemned Man has had no opportunity to defend himself under the Old Law,
he immediately stands up and says: “‘Er muß doch Gelegenheit gehabt haben, sich zu
verteidigen’” [emphasis added] (212), a strong physical gesture and forceful statement that
might be interpreted as an attempt or willingness to “physically defend” (verteidigen) the
Condemned Man himself. The Officer appears to understand the Traveler’s gesture and
remark, or the word verteidigen, in this way or as a physical threat, for in response to the
Traveler’s illegal behavior, the Officer not only “urges” the Traveler to sit down before him and
to quietly listen to his explanation, but he also “forces” him to do so: “Er nötigte den Reisenden
auf den Sessel nieder […]” [emphasis added] (213). The Traveler, it might seem, submits to the
Old Law, under which defense of the Condemned Man, in any form, is strictly forbidden and
commands are physically enforced. However, there is another way to read the image. If the
military Officer is forceful in standing, the intellectual Traveler, who, despite his gesture, is
clearly no “military defender” but more likely a “legal [one]” (Verteidiger), is forceful in sitting:
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he defends, not with his physical body, but with his mind and with language. Indeed, according
to the literal reading of a word, the Officer has actually forced the Traveler into the seated
position, not just of a legal defender, but of an even higher legal authority, who sides with the
Condemned Man. As the Traveler is sitting or is seated before the Officer, his gesture might
literally enact a term that names “leaders [of an assembly]” or the “superior(s)” in the Penal
Colony. He has assumed the position of a Vorsitzenden or a Vorgesetzten, an absurd, verbal
twist that reverses the Old Law as it makes a mockery of it. If the Condemned Man had been
forced earlier to honor his superior(s), the Officer must now honor those that are seated in
front of him or simply the man or any man that sits in a chair. According to a certain literal
reading of a word, the Traveler is to be honored as an authority or judge in the Penal Colony.
The nature and effectiveness of the Traveler’s judgment in the Penal Colony is clearly
related to his authority under the New Law but can be, it seems, most directly linked to an
alternate reading of the term that refers to it (Urteil). The word can refer, in a Judeo-Christian
context, to a “Godly judgment”: “Wenn du das Urteil lässest hören vom Himmel, so erschrickt
das Erdreich und wird still” [emphasis added] (Psalm 76.9) and, by further verbal association, to
a “Verurteilung” or “conviction” that also carries the unavoidable sense of “condemnation” or
“damnation.” However, it can also refer, not only to a “logical judgment,” but, in matters of
taste, to a “personal opinion.” Therefore, a potentially extreme shift in the interpretation of
legal judgment can already be found where the Officer declares the uselessness of voicing the
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deadly condemnation to the Condemned Man under the Old Law.59 He says to the Traveler: “Es
wäre nützlos es [sein eigenes Urteil] ihm [dem Verurteilten] zu verkünden” (211). In a striking
reversal, the Officer’s statement can be translated as: It would be impractical to declare to him
his own [or personal] opinion. In this way, the transition from a judgment too powerful for
words to one so personal it cannot be dictated is a shift in how the term Urteil is read. This
reading seems to explain the Traveler’s hesitation in condemning the Officer’s legal procedure,
though he is firmly convinced of its inhumanity. Condemnation would be impossible, if the
Traveler‘s stated opinion is no more significant than any other man: “Wenn ich eine Meinung
aussprechen würde, so wäre es die Meinung eines Privatmannes, um nichts bedeutender als
die Meinung eines beliebigen anderen […]” [emphasis added] (230). Yet, it is precisely the
Traveler’s inability to condemn that seems so destructive to the Old Law or Old Commandant’s
method of legal judgment in the Penal Colony. The new superior in the court judges differently,
or an unresolvable conflict in the term Urteil dictates, not only that the Traveler dissents in his
final judgment, when he says “Ich bin ein Gegner dieses Verfahrens” (235), but that this
judgment will fully reverse the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s method of judgment under the
Old Law. It will free the Condemned Man and subject the Officer to a new judgment.

59

This declaration of the Officer is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.9.The Undeclared Judgment of the
Condemned Man (pg.45).
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II.9.The Revenge of the Condemned Man
As soon as the Officer frees the Condemned Man, the Officer turns to the Traveler and
shows him the law or legal document that is to determine the new judgment. According to the
Officer, it reads “Sei gerecht” (“Be just,” 238). The Officer then places this document in the
drafter, prepares the machine, and removes his clothes. As this time, the Condemned Man
appears to notice a great reversal in the law or legal judgment in the Penal Colony. He notices
that the Officer will be executed under the machine, and he views the Officer’s death as a
legitimate act of revenge, likely sanctioned through an order of the Traveler:
Besonders der Verurteilte schien von der Ahnung eines großen Umschwungs
getroffen zu sein. Was ihm geschehen war, geschah nun dem Offizier. Vielleicht
würde es bis zum Äußersten gehen. Wahrscheinlich hatte der fremde Reisende
den Befehl dazu gegeben. Das war also Rache. Ohne selbst bis zum Ende
gelitten zu haben, wurde er doch bis zum Ende gerächt. [emphasis added] (241)
A phonetic association in the law or legal document that the Officer reads aloud to the
Traveler, appears to determine the judgment in this way. The command Sei gerecht (“Be just”)
might be phonetically perceived as Sei gerächt (“Be avenged”). In a phonetic sense, the
command to be just is much like an order to be avenged. The Condemned Man might
experience the Traveler’s judgment as an order for revenge on his behalf, and he might witness
the Officer’s execution instead of being executed himself, due to this particular association in
the command Sei gerecht. It is this reading that might also, at least partly, explain the extreme
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reversal in judgment under the New Law or the destructive and brutal nature of the Officer’s
execution.

II.10.The Destruction of the Machine and the Death of the Officer
Many of the central images surrounding the destruction of the machine, during the
Officer’s execution at the end of the story, appear to develop out of earlier verbal associations,
some of which can be directly linked to the Traveler, as the representative of the New Law
under the New Commandant. One particularly clear example can be found where the
Condemned Man is being strapped into the machine and prepared for what is supposed to be
his execution. When the Condemned Man lifts his only free arm and points unknowingly in the
Traveler’s direction, the wrist strap that is being secured to his other arm tears:
[Der Verurteilte] streckte, während der Soldat mit seiner rechten Hand
beschäftigt war, die linke aus, ohne zu wissen wohin; es war aber die Richtung,
wo der Reisende stand […] Der Riemen, der für das Handgelenk bestimmt war,
riß [...] [emphasis added] (220-221)
This scene is particularly revealing, in that it appears to foreshadow the later destruction of the
machine as a consequence of the Traveler’s authority and judgment. Most importantly, it
appears to develop entirely out of words that refer to the Traveler. For instance, the machine’s
wrist strap might tear because when the Condemned Man points to where the Traveler stood,
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he also directs the reader, not just to the Traveler himself, but to his name and to a phonetic
association within his name: to “der Reisende” and to the homophone, der Reißende (“the man
who tears”).60 In this verbal sense, the Penal Colony’s execution machine tears, and is
ultimately destroyed, because the Traveler, or the man who tears, declares himself an enemy of
the Old Commandant’s legal procedure: “Ich bin ein Gegner dieses Verfahrens” (235).
The Officer’s brutal death under the machine, as it is destroyed, can likewise be traced
through verbal associations. This is perhaps most clearly the case with one of the final images
of the story, in which the Officer’s forehead is split with the large iron spike of the execution
machine: “[…] durch die Stirn ging die Spitze des großen eisernen Stachels” (246). The image
appears to originate in a figure used by the narrator in expressing the Traveler’s hopes in the
New Commandant and his intentions for the Penal Colony. The narrator says: “[Der Reisende]
setzte einige Hoffnung auf den neuen Kommandanten, der offenbar, allerdings langsam, ein
neues Verfahren einzuführen beabsichtigte, das dem beschränkten Kopf dieses Offiziers nicht
eingehen konnte” [emphasis added] (214). Though, in the figurative sense of the narrator’s
expression, the New Commandant’s procedure could not enter “the narrow mind of the
Officer” (dem beschränkten Kopf dieses Offiziers), in the literal sense, it could enter “the small
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The verb reißen (“to tear”) is historically related to schreiben and zeichnen, still immediately evident in terms
such as Reißbrett and Umriss or in the English verb “[to] write” [emphasis added] (DW 14, 754). Thus, “to write”
and “to draw” also carries the historical sense “to tear.” Under the New Commandant, the machine might “tear”
because it “writes” or “draws.” This association might also explain how the script[ure] or drawings in the Old
Commandant’s legal documents could become the “Rißwunden” of the Condemned Man (237). For a further
discussion of the Old Commandant’s legal documents, see Section I.7.The Precious Legal Documents of the Old
Commandant (p.39).
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head of the Officer.” Ultimately, it is not the Traveler but associations in his name, and in the
words signifying his thoughts and behavior under the New Commandant, which appear to
determine much of the event surrounding the destruction of the machine. The legal procedure
in the Penal Colony under the New Law, much like under the Old Law, is the verbal process that
is “In der Strafkolonie.”
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Conclusion
Scholars have consistently, and almost without exception, defined Franz Kafka’s literary
works as a search for the Law and pursuit of Truth. Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is one of
the most profound and ambiguous works of this type. The task of referencing its symbolism
and understanding its language can seem, at times, as daunting as that of the Officer and
Traveler, who search the intricate and indecipherable signs of the Old Commandant’s legal
documents. For this reason, the thesis only scratches the surface of an attempt to trace Kafka’s
search for the Law in a story to which possible scholarly approaches seem almost limitless. Axel
Hecker, for example, declares the story an entire western-philosophical history, a
“Geistesgeschichte en miniature” (87).61 If, for Hecker, Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is a
philosophical history, it is also possible, that the story could be read from an entirely different
perspective or as an Eastern philosophical history. Kafka, though a Western-European and
Jewish writer, went so far as to call himself Chinese,62 while a few of Kafka’s fragments or short
stories, most notably “Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer” (1917), appear to be located in the
Orient. According to Mark Anderson,63 the central metaphors of “In der Strafkolonie” are long-
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Through a post-modern lens, Hecker traces the Officer’s religious Idealism, through the Traveler’s enlightened
Rationalism, to the Condemned Man’s humanistic Materialism.
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In May 1916, two years after writing “In der Strafkolonie,” Kafka declared in a letter to Felice Bauer: “im Grunde
bin ich ja Chinese” (Briefe 1914 161).
63

Mark Anderson has approached “In der Strafkolonie” as a history of artistic decadence at the Habsburg fin de
siècle.
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known, by Kafka scholars, to have originated in Octave Mirbeau’s novel of 1899, Torture
Garden, set in China.64 And indeed, the broken verbal imagery in “in der Strafkolonie,”
particularly of the destroyed writing machine at the narrative’s end, is traceable to eastern
philosophy. Though with no reference to Kafka, the renowned literary critic and philosopher
George Steiner, writes, in a study of western and eastern philosophies of language, for
example, of “the fragmentation that speech necessarily entails” in eastern philosophic theories
of language (12).
However complex its images and historical associations may be, “In der Strafkolonie”
also simply remains one of Kafka’s twentieth century language myths, fundamentally influenced
by traditional Judaic language philosophy. Like many of Kafka’s myths or fictional narratives,
“In der Strafkolonie” expresses “modern doubts that the law […] can be revealed through
language, at least human language” (Allen Thiher, Fiction Refracts Science 139). What makes
this myth unique, and should also give it a more central place in Kafka’s literary oeuvre,
however, is that it can actually be read through historical associations in the German language,
and in remarkable detail. For the purposes of the thesis, Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is,
not so much a German language history, but the history or the story of how Kafka and his
reader interprets words. Though a few scholars have convincingly claimed this to be true, and
partially documented it, for some of Kafka’s major works, this is now the first of Kafka’s stories
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Much like Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie,” Mirbeau’s novel tells of a French Explorer who visits an Oriental island
and discovers its refined torture techniques.
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that has been fully approached in this way. As was demonstrated in the thesis, Kafka’s entire
“In der Strafkolonie,” including the setting and its central images and events, seems to be
rooted in verbal associations. The fictional, bloodied and broken body of the Law on the
tropical island in the Penal Colony is the actual body of the metaphor that is “In der
Strafkolonie”: The legal procedure in the “tropics” is also a verbal operation in “tropes”
(Tropen), and the reader, like the central characters in the story, interprets it there. The fact
that the Traveler leaves the Penal Colony at the end of the narrative, however, suggests
alternative readings, which provide a mode of escape for the reader. If Franz Kafka’s “In der
Strafkolonie” does not control our entire life, or even remind us of its reality, at least it seems
to determine our experiences as we read it. The Law of life is death, a Law that must be denied
if we are to live. This is an inescapable fact that really gets under our skin. Es geht uns unter die
Haut. And yet, this is, just as assuredly, not the end or the last word. There are other stories to
be read. Glaubet und wartet.65
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Franz Kafka, “In der Strafkolonie” (247)
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